Modi, J.—This is a second appeal by the defendants in a suit for injunction.

2. The plaintiffs Badia, Pakhia, Nawala and Tala claimed that they were Bapidars of Khasra No. 169 situate in village Deoli, Tehsil Desuri. and that they were in possession of the said land Their case was that the defendants, (except the jagirdar of Deoli) who owned houses on the north-western and southwestern side of their land had built a number of doors opening on to the plaintiffs land and also carved out a new way through the said land and, therefore, they prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants from using the plaintiffs land for purposes of passage and also an injunction enjoining them to close the doors in question. Out of the defendants, Samratha, Poma, Natha, Nawala, Bala, Hirka, Mania. Panniya, Moti, Nawala and Hakia admitted the plaintiffs claim and stated that they had opened the doors in question and the way at the instance of the jagirdar and that these did not exist ever before. The other defendants who are appellants in this Court resisted the plaintiffs suit on numerous grounds. Their principal contention was that the way and the doors were old. Both lower courts decreed the plaintiffs suit and granted them the injunction prayed for. The defendants appellants have now come up in second appeal.

3. I may state at once that it is not open to the appellants to question certain findings of fact, which have been concurrently arrived at by the courts below. One such finding is that the doors and the way in question have not been established to be old and were of recent creation. Another such finding is that the plaintiffs were the Bapidars of Khasra No. 169 and were in possession thereof. Both lower courts have found against the defendants on these points and their findings are binding on this Court in second appeal. Learned counsel for the defendats appellants strenuously argued, however, that the courts below had fallen into error in granting the injunction to the plaintiffs in respect of the doors and the right of way because they had failed to arrived at a district and definite finding to the effect that the area of Khasra No.169 extended right up to and touched the houses of the contesting defendants. Having given my careful consideration to this argument, I have come to the conclusion that it is without any substance. It appears to me that this point was not at all a subject of controversy in the courts below. In fact, a perusal of the written statement filed by the contesting defendants, fairly read, leads one to conclude that their case in the trial court was not that there was any intervening strip of land between the land of the plaintiffs and the houses of the contesting defendants, but that their case really was that the plaintiffs were not the owners of Khasra No. 169, and secondly that the doors and the way had not been made a new but were old. I am, therefore, of opinion that the defendants appellants cannot be allowed in this second appeal to make out a new case for the first time and I over-rule this contention.

4. Proceeding on the basis, therefore, that the doors and the way in question have not been in existence for the prescriptive period and are new, the next question which has been raised before me and calls for determination is whether the defendants appellants can be prevented from opening doors in the walls of their own houses. The contention of learned counsel on their behalf is that they have opened the doors in their own houses and that they are perfectly entitled in law to do so; and, therefore, it is not open to the plaintiffs to subject to their being opened and that if they feel aggrieved on that account, it is open to them to erect the requisite structures such as a well etc. on their own land with a view to close them up. Learned counsel has cited a number of authorities in support of his proposition. These are Kashinath vs. Ram Jiwan(l), a case of the Lahore High Court, Syed Pitchai vs. Devaji Rao

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