Wanchoo, C.J.—These are three applications for issue of a writ of certiorary under Art. 226 of the Constitution against the order of the industrial Tribunal at Jaipur.

2. We propose to decide them by one judgment as the paints raised in them are common. It seems that disputes are going on between Messrs Duduwala and Company on the one hand and their employees on the other, represented by Khan Mazdoor Congress Bhilwara, a registered Union of workers. In one of the cases the dispute was referred to the Tribunal on the 16th of June, 1956, in the other on the 25th of August, 1956, in the third on the 4th of September, 1956. Soon after the parties had appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, applications were nude both on behalf of the employers and the Union for appearance through certain representatives. The Union applied for appearance through Shri R. P. Ladha, a practising advocate. The case of the Union was based on sec. 36 (1) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and Shri R.P. Ladha was allowed to represent the Union in view of that provision. The employers, who are the applicants before us, prayed that they might be represented through Shri Y. S. Nahar, also a practising lawyer and said that he was competent to represent them under sec. 36(2)(a). This was opposed by the Union and the Tribunal, while apparently holding that Shri Nahar was the Joint Honorary Secretary of the Association of Employers of which Messrs. Duduwala and Company were member and would, therefore, be qualified under Sec. 36 (2) (as to represent the employers, did not permit him to do so on the ground that as Shri Nahar was appointed in July, 1956, and as the disputes, out of which these two cases arose, had either arisen or been referred to the Tribunal by that time, the appointment of Shri Nahar was to circumvent the law as contained in sec. 36 (3) and (4) of the Act. Sub-sec. (3) prohibits a lawyer from appearing in any conciliation proceedings or before any industrial court and sub-sec. (4) prohibits a lawyer from appearing before a tribunal unless the other side consents.

3. Besides this the employers also wanted to be represented by two other persons, namely Shri Baldwa and Shri Chadmal Surana, in whose favour they had executed special powers of attorney. The Industrial Tribunal did not allow them on the ground that sec. 36 (2) did not permit anyone to represent the employers before it on the basis of a special power of attorney. Aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal, Messrs. Duduwala and Company have filed three applications.

4. The application has been opposed by the workers* Union and learned counsel appearing on their behalf supports the grounds on which the Industrial Tribunal has found against the employers.

5. There are thus only two points of law in this case—

(1) Whether sec. 36 is exhaustive of the right to represent before an industrial court or tribunal and, therefore, no party can claim to be represented through a person to whom he has given a special power of attorney, and,

(2) Whether a practising lawyer, who holds one of the capacities in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of sec. 36(2) can be prohibited from appearing before an industrial tribunal on the ground that his appointment was a circumvention of the provisions of sub-sec. (4).

6. So far as the first point is concerned, the answer to our mind is quite clear. The Industrial Disputes Act is a special law providing for certin special contingencies. It must therefore be treated as complete code in itself and when it provides for representation of employees and employers before industrial courts or tribunals, that must be held to be exhaustive. There ii no reason why we should import the provisions of the general law regarding representation before courts and tribunals appointed under the Industrial Disputes Act. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that sec. 36 does not contemplate anyone representing employers or employees on the bests of ay special power of attor

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