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1960 Supreme(Raj) 144

Rajasthan High Court
Sarjoo Prosad C. J. & Bhargava, J.
Smt. Sardar Devi - Appellant
Versus
Nihalkaran - Respondents
D.B. Civil Regular First Appeal 75 of 1960
Decided On : July 20, 1960

Advocates Appeared:
Sagarmal Mehta, for Appellant; Kansingh, Government Advocate

Headnote:Court Fees Act, Schdl. II, Art. 17(6)—Decree directing payment by instalments as well as interest till date of realisation—Appeal by plaintiff against grant of instalments—Court fee payable under Art. 17(6).

       

Sarjoo Prosad, C.J.—The only question which arises at this stage is in regard to the court fee paid by the appellant on the memorandum of appeal. The office has objected to the court-fee paid on the ground of its insufficiency and it claims that the appellant is liable to pay ad valorem court fee on the difference of the decretal amount taken as a whole and the present value of the instalments.

2. The plaintiff appellant instituted a suit to which this appeal relates for recovery of a sum of money. The court below has passed a decree in her favour for a sum of Rs.l1,500/- principal in addition to interest at 6% upto the date of the institution of the suit and the date of the decree, thereby making a total sum of Rs. 12,526 43 nP. Thereafter the decree allows interest to the appellant at 4-1/2% from 1.10.59 till realisation on the principal sum remaining due. The decree further directs payment of the amount in instalments. The plaintiff has appealed against the decree granting instalments to the defendant-respondent and has paid a court fee Rs. 10/- only treating the memorandum of appeal as falling under Schedule 2 of Art. 17(6) of the Court Fees Act. Incidentally in the grounds of appeal the appellant has taken exception also to the reduction of interest pendente lite by the court below and grant of interest at 4-1/2% after the passing of the decree; but that is a matter which lies in the discretion of the court and therefore the appellant is not liable to pay court-fee on that account.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that her main grievance in the appeal is about the grant of instalments and it is therefore, in the, circumstances, of this case, not possible to estimate the money value of the subject matter in dispute. The decree in question does provide for payment of interest also and all that the appellant now desires is that the whole amount decreed should be paid to her immediately instead of being paid in instalments. Therefore, such a relief is not possible of being valued in money.

4. On behalf of the State the learned Government Advocate contends that some notional value should be attached to this relief, because after all if the amount is realised it is reasonably expected that the appellant would make some investment of the amount and intends to be able to earn larger profits and interest than what has Deen allowed under the decree in question. He therefore, submits that the court fees should be paid on this notional valuation. We are unable to assess any notional value on the basis suggested by the learned Government Advocate. Even if it is assumed that the part of the decree which seriously affects the appellant is the direction that only in case of default of three instalments she would be entitled to the whole decretal amount and as such, the should be liable to pay court fee on the value of the three instalments granted, we find that that assumption would not be correct. The obvious reason is that it may be that the defendant respondent may continue to pay me instalments due as directed in the decree. It is essentially a penal clause against the defendant. Thus we come back to the position that all that the appellant wants in me appeal is to recover the whole decretal amount at-once avoiding the instalments and since interest has been already decreed to her the only conclusion at which we arrive is that no pecuniary valuation can be put on the relief prayed. The decree does grant her interest and all that he suffers is that instead of getting the amount due atonce the payment of the amount is postponed to certain periods as indicated in the decree.

5. We have not been able to have any direct precedent on that point either of this Court of any other court; but our attention has been drawn to certain cases which may be of some assistance in the context. In Lukhun Chunder Ash vs. Khoda Buksh Mondul (1), a decree was made payable in three instalments and the plaintiff appealed on the ground that it sho













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