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1960 Supreme(Raj) 283

Rajasthan High Court
Sarjoo Prosad C.J. & Beri, J.
Chandra Bhan - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan - Respondents
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.354 of 1960
Decided On : November 09, 1960

Advocates Appeared:
C.L. Agrawal and L.L. Sharma, for Petitioners; G.C. Kasliwal Advocate, General, with Kan Singh, Government Advocate, for Respondents; M.M. Vyas and J.G. Chhangani, for Interveners

Headnote:(a) Motor Vehicles Act, Sec. 68-D—Rule not ultra vires.(b) Natural Justice—Prohibition against a person to be judge in its own cause—Principle whether extended to official duty under statute.(c) Motor Vehicles Act, Sec.133 —Applicability.

       

SARJOO PROSAD, C.J.—In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners pray for a writ against the respondents restraining them from adopting and approving a scheme, which has been formulated and published for nationalisation of road transport. The main ground on which the petition is founded is the assertion that the provisions of section 68 D of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act No. IV of 1939—hereinafter called "the Act") are ultra vires the Constitution of India and that some of the relevant Rules of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1960 (hereinafter called "the Rules") framed under the Act are equally ultra vires the provisions of the Act and the Constitution.

2. The petitioners are transport operators having their buses plying on different routes, locally known as Jaipur-Alwar-Med route, Jaipur-Neem-ka-Thana route, and Jaipur-Kotputli route. These routes are overlapped also by the Jaipur-Delhi route and the Jaipur-Pratap-garh route. Some previous schemes of nationalisation of the aforesaid routes purporting to be under section 68-C of the Act and the Rules framed for the purpose were either cancelled by the Government itself or struck down under orders of this Court by an appropriate writ. Thereafter new draft Rules were published on 4th June, 1960 and objections invited. The petitioners and other operators filed their objections to the Rules in question and eventually the Rules were published as finalised in a Gazette Extraordinary on 19th August, 1960. In pursuance of the Rules a fresh scheme of nationalisation of road transport was published on 8th September, 1960, and objections have been invited to the scheme. The petitioners have, therefore, come up to this Court praying for appropriate writs prohibiting the respondents from approving the scheme in question. It is contended that by virtue of sec. 68-D of the Act the Government has constituted itself a Judge of the dispute vis a vis the Transport Undertaking owned, controlled and run by the Government on the one hand and the private bus operators on the other. This is violative of the fundamental principle of natural justice that a person should not be a judge in his own cause. The State Government, it is argued, being deeply interested in the scheme for nationalisation of road transport and having already declared its avowed policy in favour of nationalisation will not be able to judge dispassionately and without any bias the objections preferred by the different operators to the finalis-ation of the scheme. With reference to the Rules it is contended that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and are in excess of the powers given to the Government under the Act. For instance; it is said that the definition of "State Transport Undertaking given in Rule 2 (1) (e) is ultra vires, being restrictive in its meaning as compared with the comprehensive definition laid down in the Act itself. R. 3 is said to be vague and lacking in material particulars. The petitioners submit that a scheme of road transport should take account of matters as to whether a particular service already running on a particular route is inefficient, and whether the State Undertaking is likely to make it more efficient or adequate and remove the deficiency, and whether, economically it is likely to be advantageous to the public if the scheme is given effect to. Similarly it is argued that clause (b) of Rule 9 gives an arbitrary power to the General Manager to act as a sort of a superior authority so as to dictate to the Regional Transport Authority to act in a certain manner thereby depriving it of its quasi judicial function under section 62 of the Act. For the intervener Mr. Vyas has further contended that the use of the word "forthwith" in clause (c) of this Rule makes it run counter to the provisions of sec. 57 of the Act in accordance wherewith the State Undertaking has to apply for the grant of a permit as held by the Supreme Court






























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