CHHANGANI, J.—The appellant Seth Ramrichpal Sirya, on behalf of himself and as manager and karta of the joint Hindu family known as Tilokchand Dilsukhrai, resident of Ajmer, has filed this appeal under sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, dated 16.2.1960, over-ruling the appellants objections to the validity of the award and making award a rule of the Court and directing a decree in terms of award.

2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are briefly these.

3. The respondent M/s. Ajmer Traders, a registered partnership firm, Naya Bazar, Ajmer, through its partner Birdhichand of Ajmer put in an application in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, on 18th March, 1958, against Seth Ramrichpal Sirya of Ajmer, praying for a judgment and decree on the basis of an award. The respondent applicants case was that the respondent and the appellant having had some dispute in regard to certain shop situated outside Railway Good-shed, Ajmer, known as "Sirya Market Ajmer" referred their dispute for arbitration to Shri Krishna Gopal Garg under an agreement dated 25.7.1956. The arbitrator Shri Krishna Gopal Garg gave his award on 25.10.1956. The respondent produced the award with the application and, as stated earlier, prayed for a judgment and decree on its basis. It appears that without notice to the appellant, the court began ex parte proceedings. On 19.11.1958, the appellant appeared before the court and applied for setting aside the ex parte proceedings. The court by its order dated 17.11.1959 set aside the ex parte proceeding and the appellant was granted time to file his objections on or before 21st December 1959. The appellant actually filed his objections on 18.12.1959 urging various grounds against the validity of the award and prayed for either setting aside of the award or for remitting it for reconsideration. Apart from these objections the appellant also raised a legal objection that the award having not been filed by the arbitrator or by anybody else acting under the authority of the arbitrator, there was no proper filing of the award in court and, therefore, the court could not entertain an application for making the award a rule of the court and passing a decree in terms of the award. The respondent in its turn pleaded that the appellant having failed to file a proper application for setting aside the award within the period of 30 days from 19.11.1958, these objections were barred by limitation. The trial Judge formulated the following three points for its determination —

(1) Whether the application of the applicant for getting the decree according to terms of the award is valid under sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act or under any other section of the Act?

(2) Whether that application is within limita tion?

(3) Whether the objections filed by the oppo site party are time-barred?

On the first point, the trial Judge substantially held that the respondents application could not be treated as an application under sec. 14 of the Act. However, on the basis of a few cases, namely, Jaikishen Vs. Ramlal Gupta (1), Radhakishen Vs. Madho Krishna and another (2) and Gangaram Vs. Radhakishan (3) he held that sec. 14(2) of the Act is not exhaustive and that independently of that an application can be made by a party to the arbitration for making the award rule of the court if the award can be produced and that sec. 14 of the Act would not come into play in such a case. Such an application, according to him, was maintainable under Sec. 17 of the Act.

4. On the second point, he held that Art. 178 of the Limitation Act applies only to applications under sec. 14 of the Act and cannot govern an application which does not request tor the filing of an award but which merely prays for a judgment and decree in "terms of an award and which is accompanied by the award itself. Such a case, according to the trial Judge, would be governed by three years rule prescribed by Art.181

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