MODI, J.—This is a defendants tenants second appeal in a suit for ejectment.

2. The material facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows. It is admitted that the suit house was declared evacuee property under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, (Act No. 31 of 1950), and the defendant Lilaram (who having died is now represented by his heirs Pamandas and others, (the present appellants) was admitted as a tenant therein by the Custodian. Thereafter the plaintiffs purchased the property in question at a departmental sale held by public auction on the and June, 1955. They obtained a sale-certificate on the 14th August, 1958. It was mentioned in the sale-certificate that the sale would take effect from the 9th June, 1955. The plaintiffs gave the defendant a notice to quit on the 9th December, 1958. Thereafter they filed the present suit for ejectment on the 29th June, 1959. The plaintiffs brought their suit for ejectment on a number of grounds out of which it is only necessary to mention one for the purposes of this appeal, namely, that they were under a reasonable and bonafide necessity to occupy the suit house.

3. The defendant resisted the suit. He denied that the plaintiffs had any reasonable and bonafide necessity to occupy the house. He further contended that the suit was not maintainable in law by virtue of a notification issued under S. 29 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (Act No. 44 of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1954) which gave immunity from ejectment for a period of two years from the date of transfer.

4. Both courts below have decided the two points mentioned above against the defendants. They have consequently come up in second appeal to this Court.

5. The principal point that emerges for decision in this appeal under the circumstances mentioned above is whether the defendants were entitled not to be ejected from the suit property for a period of two years from the date of the sale-certificate by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 29 of the Act of 1954. Learned counsel for the defendants appellants contends that this section does give his clients protection for two years from ejectment from the date of the sale-certificate and strongly relies for his submission on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bombay S. & C. Industries V. L.J. Johnson(1).

6. The facts in that case were shortly these. The appellants before the Supreme Court had obtained on lease certain salt pans for a certain period which was renewed from time to time and the last renewal was upto the 15th April, 1956. On the 31st March, 1956, this property was put to auction, and the highest bid was of respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Thereafter the appellants made an application to the Chief Settlement Commissioner on a number of grounds, one of which was that under S. 29 of the Act of 1934 the appellants having been in lawful possession of the property enjoyed the statutory immunity from eviction for a period of two years. This application was dismissed and sale in favour of respondents Nos. 4 and 5 was confirmed and possess on of the salt pans was ordered to be given forthwith and the appellants were ejected accordingly. Then the appellants went in appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. It was in these circumstances that the question arose whether the appellants were entitled to any immunity from dispossession under S. 29 of the Act of 1954, and the further question which was mooted before their Lordships was as to when the sale became complete under the act and the Rules made thereunder. After discussing the effect of all the relevant provisions bearing on the matter, their Lordships concluded as follows:—

"It is clear from the rules and the conditions if sale set out above that the declaration that a person was the highest bidder at the auction does not amount to a complete sale and transfer of the property to him. T

Click Here to Read the rest of this document