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1962 Supreme(Raj) 171

Rajasthan High Court
Modi & Shinghal, JJ.
Puttolal - Appellant
Versus
H. H. Maharaja Dhiraj Shri Sumersinghji of Kishengarh - Respondents
D.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.37 of 1960
Decided On : August 29, 1962

Advocates Appeared:
M.B.L. Bhargava, for Appellant; B.K. Acharya, for Respondent

Headnote:(a) Civil P. C., O. 23, R. 3—Compromise—Need not necessarily be in writing and even if in writing need not necessarily be signed.(b) Civil P.C., O.23, R. 3—Lawful—Meaning of term—Compromise alleged as result of coercion fraud or undue influence.

       It is true that it is best if a compromise is embodied with all its terms in a document signed by all the parties, but it would be going too far to hold that it is only compromises of this type which fall within the ambit of O. 23, r. 3 and which alone can be made the foundation of a decree. Strictly speaking, even an oral compromise would be enough to attract the provisions of the rule in question though it may be difficult to prove it in actual practice. Even if there is a document embodying the terms of a compromise and none of the parties has affixed his signatures to it it would still be open to any of the parties to prove that a compromise had in fact been arrived at on the terms embodied in the unsigned document and claim a decree on the footing thereof. The true rule is that the court must look to the substance of the matter and not to its shadow. (Para 11)

       The meaning of the word lawful occurring in O.23 r. 3 is that the agreement or compromise must not be unlawful by the nature of its terms or on the face of it. It would certainly be the duty of the court where it is asked to record a compromise under this provision to see that the compromise is or is not lawful in this sense; and if it is not so lawful it must refuse to record it. But where the contention is not that the object or the consideration of the agreement was unlawful in the sense indicated above, or that it was void on the face of it, but that it was brought about by undue influence or fraud or coercion, then such an agreement, provided ofcourse it is proved to have been made, should not be condemned as unlawful within the meaning of this provision, for it is only voidable and not void. (Para 23)

MODI, J.—This is an appeal by the plaintiff Puttolal Sharma against a judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, dated the 21st January, 1960, by which he recorded a compromise alleged to have been arrived at between the parties and dismissed the plaintiffs suit in accordance with it, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

2. The material facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows. The plaintiff was a building contractor at Ajmer. The defendant is Maharaja Sumer Singh, Ruler of Kishengarh which was a neighbouring independent State in 1947 and 1949. The plaintiffs case was that as a result of an agreement between the parties, he had built two palaces for the said Ruler of Kishengarh, one at Ajmer and the other at Kishengarh and had also undertaken certain other works of a subsidiary nature for the defendant, the details of which were mentioned in the plaint and that he had repeatedly asked him and a Colonel A. Sharman, who was his controller of personal estates and was looking after all the personal properties of the defendant in that capacity, to render a full and complete account of all the works executed by the plaintiff and to make full and final payment of such amount as may be found payable to him. The defendant, however, did nothing and so the plaintiff brought the present suit against the said Ruler of Kishengarh on the 27th June, 1955 in the court of the Senior Sub.-Judge First Class, Ajmer, after obtaining the necessary sanction from the Government ot India under secs.86 and 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff valued his suit tor the purposes of rendition of accounts at Rs. 1000/- and paid court-fee thereon accordingly while for purposes of jurisdiction, he valued his claim at Rs. 60,000/-.

3. The defendant raised an objection that the suit was triable by a court of lower jurisdiction on the valuation put on it by the plaintiff which was Rs. 1000/- only.

4. The learned trial Judge held that the plaint having been valued for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 60,000/-, the plaintiff should have put the same valuation on it for purposes of court-fee, and in this view of the matter directed him to pay court-fee accordingly and to make up the deficiency therein within a stated time. The defendant, curiously enough, preferred a revision against the above-mentioned order to the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, who summarily dismissed it by his order dated the 26th September, 1956. Thereafter he filed a review application to the Judicial Commissioner against his aforesaid order and that application was heard and dismissed by a Bench of this Court on the 6th November, 1959, as the State of Ajmer had by that time been integrated with this State as a result of the States Reorganization Act (Act XXXI of 1956). While the defendants review application was pending in this Court, the plaintiff filed an application on the 2nd January, 1958, in the court of the Senior Civil Judge Ajmer to which court the case had been transferred meanwhile on the abolition of the court of Sub-Judge, First Class, Ajmer, in which he stated that he did not wish to proceed with the suit and was desirous of withdrawing it, and, therefore, made a prayer that the court be pleased to allow the plaintiff to withdraw the suit unconditionally and that the same be dismissed. This application was presented by the plaintiff Puttolal personally before the Senior Civil Judge. As the file of3 the case was in the High Court in connection with the disposal of the defendants review application, the court ordered that the application be put up on receipt of the file for orders and also remarked that the file be requisitioned from the High Court.

5. On the 26th February, 1958, the plaintiff made another application in the trial court stating that he did not wish to proceed with his application dated the 2nd January, 1958, and so solicited permission of that court to withdraw his former application. This application was taken up on










































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