Modi, J. —These are two appeals, one filed by the State, and the other by the Municipal Council, Udaipur, against a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Udaipur, by which he set aside the conviction of the accused of an offence under sec. 16(l)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (Act No. XXXVII of 1954, hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1954), and acquitted him.

2. The facts leading up to these appeals are simple. The accused was a milk-vendor in the city of Udaipur and appears to have been carrying on this business for a considerable time. On the 22nd September, 1960, he was suspected of selling adulterated milk. The Food Inspector of the Municipal Council, Udaipur, therefore took samples of the milk sold by him and sent them to the Public Analyst, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for analysis. The latter was of the opinion that the samples were of adulterated milk and that they did not conform to the prescribed standard of purity. Thereupon, the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Udaipur, accorded its sanction to the prosecution of the accused and the Food Inspector instituted a complaint, out of which these appeals arise, before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Udaipur. The learned Magistrate held the accused guilty of selling adulterated milk and convicted him under sec. 16(l)(a) of the Act of 1954, and sentenced him to six months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default to a further simple imprisonment for three months. Against this decision, the accused went up in appeal to the Additional Sessions Judge, Udaipur. It was urged before the learned Judge that there was no proper sanction for the prosecution of the accused under sec. 20(1) of the Act of 1954, and, therefore, the conviction of the accused could not be sustained in law. This contention prevailed with the learned Judge below with the result that the accused was acquitted.

3. The principal question for determination before us in the circumstances set out above is whether there was no valid sanction, or, to use the precise phraseology of sec. 20 of the Act of 1954, "written consent" of the competent authority within the meaning of that section for the prosecution of the accused. We should like to quote sec. 20 at this place in so far as it is material for our present purposes: —

"20 Cognizance and trial of offences—(1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority."

The plain meaning of this provision is that as a condition precedent to the prosecution of an offender under this Act, the prosecution must have been instituted with the "written consent" of

(1) the State Government, or

(2) a local authority, or

(3) a person authorised by the State Government in this behalf, or

(4) a person authorised by a local authority in this behalf.

It will be noticed that the various clauses set out above are disjunctive. It has also been held that before granting a written consent as required by this section, the authority competent to do so should apply its mind to the facts of the case and satisfy itself that a prima facie case exists for the alleged offender being put up before a court. See State of Bombay Vs. Parshottam Kanaiyalal(l). The question before us is whether the requirements of this section as set out above have been fulfilled in the present case.

4. Now the position here is that the prosecution of the accused was sanctioned by the Commissioner, Municipal Council, Udaipur (vide page A-8 of the record). The contentions raised before the appellate court below were (1) that the Municipal Commissioner had not been authorised by the Municipal Council to accord sanction in the matter of such prosecutions and (2) that in any case he had not applied his mind to the facts of the case before according sanction. Unfortunately an authenticated copy of the resolution passed

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