Modi, J. —This second appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration which has been dismissed by both courts below has been placed before this Bench on a reference by one of us sitting singly.

2. The facts out of which this reference arises may shortly be stated as follows. The firm Bachraj Chuniram defendant respondent No. 1 filed a suit for money against defendants respondents Bhera and Devichand. The former obtained an attachment before judgment with respect to the property of the defendants Bhera and Devichand and the present plaintiff Ranamal is alleged to have stood surety for them. Eventually respondent No. 1 obtained a decree against respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and took out execution of that decree against them as well as the surety who is the present plaintiff. The latter filed an objection saying that he never stood surety for the judgment-debtors and that no surety bond had ever been executed by him. By an order dated the 26th August, 1952, the executing court dismissed this objection summarily. The plaintiff came in revision to this Court which was dismissed on the ground that it was incompetent. Thereafter the plaintiff filed the present suit on the 2nd June, 1954, in the court of Munsiff Barmer for a declaration that the surety bond in question had never been executed by him, and., therefore, he was not bound by it and further that the decree obtained by respondent No. 1 against respondents Nos. 2 and 3 was not executable against him.

3. The judgment-debtors allowed the suit to proceed exparte against themselves. It was only the respondent No. 1 decree-holder who contested it. Some seven issues were framed by the trial court. One of these was with respect to the alleged execution of the surety bond by the plaintiff. The other important issue and with that alone we are concerned in the present reference was whether the present suit was barred by the provisions of sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court took up the last-mentioned issue as a preliminary issue in the case, and having come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs suit was barred by the provisions of sec. 47 C. P. C. dismissed it. The plaintiff went up in appeal to the District Judge, Balotra, who by his judgment and decree dated the 8th November, 1955, upheld the decision of the trial court. Thereafter the plaintiff filed a second appeal to this Court which was placed before: a learned single Judge. As the question of law involved in the case was of considerable importance and was not governed by any decision of this Court, that learned Judge thought fit to make a reference to a larger bench. This is how this case has come up before us for decision.

4. The precise question which thus emerges for determination in this case is whether a surety whose objection to the levy of execution against him has been dismissed by the executing court in a summary fashion can maintain a separate suit for obtaining the relief which was claimed by him in his objection.

5. The decision of this question is governed mainly by the provisions of sec.47 and 145 C. P. C. Sec. 47 in so far as it is material for our present purposes reads as follows—

" Questions to be determined by the court executing decree—(1) All questions arising between the parlies to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

(2)..........................................

(3)..........................................

Explanation—For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed, a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed and a purchaser at a sale in execution of the decree are parties to the suit."

It will be noticed at once that a surety does not fall within the ambit of parties mentioned in sub-sec.(1) of sec. 47, nor can he be deemed to be party within the meaning of this sub-section by anyth

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