DAVE, C.J.—This is a writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by one Bajrang Singh, erstwhile Jagirdar of Harpura, District Ajmer.

2. His jagir was resumed under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the Act). The question of compensation to be given to him was decided by the Deputy Collector (Jagir), Ajmer on 30th August, 1958. The Deputy Collector (Jagir) communicated this decision to the Government under sec. 33 of the Act and it reached the Government on 3rd of October, 1958. The Government of Rajasthan preferred an appeal against the said decision under sec. 39 of the Act and that appeal was filed on 1st December, 1958 before the Board of Revenue, Ajmer. When the appeal came up for hearing, it was urged by the petitioner, who was respondent in that appeal, that the appeal was time barred. It was pointed out that under sec. 39 of the Act 90 days time was provided for filing an appeal from the date of the decision, but it was filed two days after the expiry of that period. It was, therefore, prayed that the appeal should be dismissed as time barred. This argument prevailed with the learned Members of the Board and they dismissed the appeal on 28th January, 1960. The Government of Rajasthan then preferred a review petition in the same court. It was urged that the last date of hearing before the Deputy Collector (Jagir) was 16th June, 1958 and thereafter the case was adjourned without giving another date. The decision was pronounced by the Deputy Collector (Jagir) on 30th August, 1958. None of the parties was present on that date because they were not informed about it. On the basis of these facts it was contended that the period of limitation prescribed under sec. 39 of the Act should have been computed from 3rd October, 1958 when the appellant was informed of the decision. It was prayed that since these facts escaped the notice of the learned Members of the Revenue Board, who dismissed the appeal, that decision should be set aside. The learned Members of the Board accepted this argument, allowed the review application and set aside their previous order regarding the dismissal of the appeal. It is against this order dated Ist April, 1961 that the present writ application is directed.

3. It is urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that sec. 39 of the Act prescribed ninety days period for filing an appeal from the date of the decision against which it was directed. According to him the Board of Revenue was, therefore, justified in dismissing the appeal on 28th January, 1960 when it was found that the appeal was filed two days after the prescribed period. It is urged that the learned Members of the Board had no jurisdiction to extend the period of appeal by holding that the period of ninety days would be computed from the date the decision of the Deputy Collector (Jagir) was communicated to the Government. It is prayed that there being an error apparent on the face of the record, this Court should interfere in the matter and quash the impugned order.

4. In reply it is urged by learned Deputy Government Advocate that sec. 33 of the Act cast a duty on the Jagir Commissioner to communicate his final order as soon as practicable to the Government, the Jagirdar and every other interested person, that the Deputy Collector (Jagir) had communicated his decision to the Government under this section on 3rd October, 1958 and, therefore, the Board of Revenue had rightly allowed the review petition.

5. It would be proper to reproduce here the provisions of sec. 33 and 39 of the Act on which reliance is placed by learned counsel on either side :

"33. Communication of decision.—The Jagir Commissioner shall communicate as soon as practicable his final order made under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 32 to the Government, the Jagirdar and every other interested person."

"39. Appeals from the orders of Jagir Commissioner and Collector.—(1) The Government or any person agg

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