LODHA, J.—Plaintiff-respondent Chotey Lal filed the suit out of which this appeal arises in the court of Munsiff Sikar for cancellation of a sale deed and for possession of the land in dispute Khasra Nos. 318, 373 and 379 situated in Sikar measuring 7 Bighas. He alleged that the defendant by practising fraud got a sale deed of the land in question executed by him on 15-9-61 in the defendants favour without paying any price. It was further alleged that the sale was void ab initio being in contravention of sec. 42, second proviso(b) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as the plaintiff was a member of Scheduled Tribe. It was prayed that the sale-deed dated 15-9-61 be declared void ab initio and a decree for possession of the land in dispute and the dwelling house standing thereon be granted in favour of the plaintiff.

2. The suit was resisted by the defendant inter alia on the ground that it was exclusively triable by a revenue court and was not maintainable in civil court. The learned Munsiff tried the suit on merits and in the result held that the plaintiff had failed to prove fraud as well as lack of consideration. However, he came to the conclusion that the sale was was void-ab-initio being in contravention of the provisions of sec. 42 of the Act. As to the question of jurisdiction, he found that residential land was involved in the suit along with the agricultural land and, therefore, the suit was triable by civil court. In the result he decreed the suit as prayed.

3. Aggrived by the judgment and decree of the trial court the defendant filed appeal and the learned Civil Judge, Jhunjhurm (Camp Sikar) confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. He concurred in the finding of the Munsiff that the plaintiff had failed to prove fraud in connection with the sale of the land but he differed from the trial court on the question of consideration and held that the sale deed was proved to be with consideration. He also agreed with the trial court that the sale was void-ab-initio being in contravention of the provisions of sec. 42 of the Act. As regards the objection about the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit he reached the same conclusion as arrived at by the trial court though on different grounds. He held that the suit was based on a cause of action in respect of which relief could be obtained only from a civil court.

4. In this second appeal learned counsel for the appellant has urged only the question of jurisdiction. It has been argued by him that the suit is cognizable by revenue court only.

5. Sec. 207 of the Act which is relevant, reads as under :—

"S. 207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only—(1) All suits and applications of the nature specified in Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.

(2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief can be obtained by means of any such suit or application.

Explanation—If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief might be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court is greater than, or additional to, or is not identical with, that which the revenue court could have granted."

6. The subject-matter involved in the suit is agricultural land as also a dwelling house erected on the holding by the tenant for his own occupation and is at may rate a construction on the holding for agricultural purposes. It is not disputed that a suit for possession of the land and the house in question would lie in revenue court. The finding given by the trial court in this respect that the suit is partly for possession of a residential house as distinct from a dwelling house on a holding, has not been supported or relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent and that is why I have said that the suit is indisputably for p

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