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1974 Supreme(Raj) 112

Rajasthan High Court
Shinghal, J.
Dr. P.L.Jauhar - Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan - Respondents
S.B. Misc. (Contempt of Court) Petition No. 3 of 1974
Decided On : August 22, 1974

Advocates Appeared:
Rajnarain Munshee, for Petitioner; A.K. Mathur, for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4; D.K. Soral, for Respondent No. 5

Headnote:Contempt of Court Act, 1971, Sec. 21—Petitioner having opportunity filing petition long after expiry of one year—Held that petition barred by sec. 20.

       

SHINGHAL, J.—As the learned counsel for the respondents have been successful in raising a preliminary objection against the maintainability of these proceedings on the grounds of limitation, it will be sufficient to state those facts which bear on it.

2. Dr. P.L. Jauhar, the present petitioner, filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.946 of 1969 to challenge the appointment of Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma, respondent No. 5, as Deputy Director Medical (E. S. I.), by order Ex. 1 dated March 7, 1969, when that post fell vacant on the retirement of Dr. D.N. Rai. That petition was allowed by a judgment of this Court dated January 29, 1971, and it was directed as follws—

"It will thus appear that the impugned order Ex.1 dated March 7, 1969 is quite illegal, and it is set aside with the direction that the post of Deputy Director in question should be filled up by the State Government according to the law. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from respondent No. 1."

The State Government did not, however, revert Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma and did not care to fill the post of Deputy Director according to the law. The petitioner therefore filed the present petition on December 20, 1973, praying that the respondents may be suitably punished for disobedience of the aforesaid directions dated January 29, 1971. The petition was admitted, and rule was issued to the respondents requiring them to appear in this court and answer the allegation. They filed their replies in which they took the plea inter alia, that it was not Permissible for this Court to initiate any proceedings for contempt after the expiry of the period of one year specified in sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, hereafter referred to as "the Act". The learned counsel for the petitioner filed a rejoinder, as also an application under sec 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of the delay. The preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondents therefore relates to the bar of limitation, and it is necessary to decide the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed by the respondents.

3. As has been stated, the judgment in the writ petition was delivered on January 29, 1971 by which this court set aside the order dated March 7, 1969 promoting Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma as Deputy Director Medical (E. S. I ), which was a post encadred in the Rajasthan Medical Service, and gave the direction that the post should be filled by the State Government according to the law It has been stated by the petitioner, in his affidavit dated February 6, 1974, and is not in dispute, that Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma was allowed to continue on the post of Deputy Director (E.S.I.) until April 1, 1971 and was thereafter transferred to the other cadre post of Deputy Director (Medical) which he held until October 30, 1971. He was thereafter appointed as State Family Planning Officer, which was not a cadre post. It is therefore quite clear, on the admit-ted facts, that the contempt, if any, was committed by October 30, 1971 whereas the present petition was filed on December 20, 1973.

4. The question then is whether proceedings for contempt could be initiated against the respondents after the expiry of the period of one year specified sec. 20 of the Act?

5. It has been argued by Mr. Rajnarain, learned counsel for the petitioner, that a statute of limitation ceases to be a statute of mere procedure where it shortens the period of limitation and the period of limitation prescribed by sec. 20 of the Act cannot therefore govern the present petition because the cause of action which had accrued to the petitioner earlier, under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, could not be defeated by recourse to sec. 20 of the Act. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Rajah of Pittapur vs. Gani Benkata Subba Row(l), Panna vs. Madan Lal(2), and Government of Rajasthan vs. Sangram Singh(3) in support of his argument. He has also invited attention to the decisions in Syed Mohammed Yar Khan vs. Syed Yousuf Yar





















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