BERI, C.J.—These three writ petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution of India raise an identical question and can be disposed of by a single judgment Different learned Members of the Board of Revenue by their judgments of different dates following the decision of the Full Bench of the Board of Revenue in Madhosingh vs. Moti Lal(l) declined to hear the three review petitions of the petitioners before us, on the ground that the judgments against which those review applications were made, were rendered by the Members who were no longer attached to the Board of Revenue and the petitions failed in view of the interpretation given to O. 47 r. 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Full Bench of the Board of Revenue.

2. While the learned counsel for the petitioners before us contend that the view taken in Madhosinghs case (1) is erroneous, the learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioners supported it for the reasons given therein.

3. In Madhosinghs case (1) the view taken by the learned Members of the Board of Revenue has been expressed in para 53 of the judgment, which reads:

"To sum up, the conditions for R. 5 of O.47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to come into play are (i) that the Member or Members any one of them who passed the decree or order sought to be reviewed continues or continue to be attached to the Court at the time when the application for review is presented, and (ii) that such Member or Members is not or are not precluded i. e. prevented, by absence of other cause for a period of six months next after the presentation from considering the decree or order sought to be reviewed. If the conditions are satisfied, only the Member or Members referred to shall hear the application. They may hear it within the period of six months or even after the expiry of that period. No other Member or Members can in the circumstances (i. e.) if the said conditions are satisfied) hear the application, either within the six months or even after the expiry of that period. In that event, the bar against other Members hearing the application is a total bar. This prohibition applies to both the stages of hearing of the application, namely the exparte hearing stage for admission, and if the application is admitted, the subsequent stage of hearing both parties after notice."

The above view was taken by the learned Members on the basis of the decision of the Travancore Cochin High Court reported in Sikar vs. Volayudhan Ponnan(2). In that case Sankaran, Gangadhar Menon JJ. have taken the view which has been adopted by the Board of Revenue while Subramania Iyer J. took a contrary view. Another Full Bench of the Travencore-Cochin High Court consisting of Sankaran, Govinda Pillai and Subramania Iyer, JJ. took a diametrically opposite view in Narayanan vs. Raman(3).

4. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Narayanans case (3) and we shall presently state our reasons for so doing.

5. The remedy of review, which is a reconsideration of the judgment at the same level by which it was rendered, appears to have been borrowed from the Courts of Equity. There was no such remady available at Common Law. This remedy has a remarkable resemblance with the remedy known as writ of error. Nevertheless, like appeal the remedy by way of a review is a creature of stature. Unless authorised by law expressly or by implication a right to ask for a review of a judgment delivered cannot be assumed. Therefore, in order to ascertain its authority and scope, reference will have to be made, to the relevant statutes. The cases before us are revenue cases. Sec, 229 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act lay down:

229. Power of review by Board and other revnue courts—Subject to provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908)—

(1) the Board of its own motion or on the application of a party to a suit or proceeding, may review and may rescind, alter or confirm any decree or order made by itself or by any of its members; and

(2) every revenue court, ot

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