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1975 Supreme(Raj) 81

Rajasthan High Court
Tyagi, J.
State of Rajasthan - Appellant
Versus
Jagdish Chandra - Respondents
S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 216 of 1973
Decided On : July 22, 1975

Advocates Appeared:
J.K. Singhi, for Appellant; R.L. Garg, for Respondent

Headnote:(a) Rajasthan Service Rules, R. 23A(1) and (2)—Three years period to be counted upto date when employee actually relieved of charge and not upto date when notice issued or received— Where notice within period of three years but employee allowed to work after period of three years held that notice under cl. (1) not valid and the case would be governed by cl. (2)(b) Constitution of India, Art. 311—Two days after suspension services of employee terminated—No grounds of suspension order—What became of suspension order not shown—In the circumstances termination of service cannot be held bonafide.

       Simply because a notice under rule 23A is issued to a temporary employee bis service does not automatically come to an end. The service of an employee stands terminated only when he is directed to relinquish the charge of his office and not on the issuance or serving the notice under rule 23 A of the R.S.R. If for one reason of the other the Government allowed its employee to work in his job for a period of more than 3 years the procedure to be followed to remove the temporary employee will be one which is contained in sub-rule (2) of Rule 23A.

       Held = The termination of service is coextensive with the permanently relinquishing of the charge of the office held by the temporary employee In the present case the plaintiff was allowed to stay in service under the notice issued by an appointing authority under rule 23A(1) upto 5/05/1966 which date definitely falls beyond a period of three years continuous service in the Government and, therefore, the question that arises for my determination is whether the plaintiff who had already received a notice of termination under Rule 23A(l) could be removed from service after he was allowed to continue in service for a period exceeding 3 years under the notice issued under Rule 23A (1) or whether the procedure incorporated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 23A will be attracted.

       Held = In my opinion the object of notice under Rule 23A is not that the Government servant should know the exact date of his removal but it is kept with a purpose that the temporary employee may gain some breathing time before he gets acclimatised to the new situation of being thrown out of employment

       Held = The period of one month as prescribed by Rule 23A of the RSR is mandatory and the Government while exercising its power under this rule should strictly comply with the requirement of the rule and give one month notice. In no case however, the Government can extend the the period of notice to allow the Government servant to continue in Government service for more than 3 years. If deliberately or otherwise the Government permits a temporary Government employee to remain in continuous service for more than 3 years then in that event it would not be open to the Government to ask the temporary employee to quit his job in accordance with the provision of Rule 23A(1) In that case Rule 23A(2) would be attracted which undoubtedly confers a very valuable right on a Government employee because he is to be treated like a permanent employee so for as the matter of the temination of his service is concerned. The appointing authority deliberately permitted two months time to the plaintiff before he was asked to relinquish the charge of his office On 5th of May when the plaintiff had to leave bis job under the notice he was definitely in continuous Government service for more than 3 years and therefore he has right to claim that procedure provided in sub-rule (2) of Rule 23A was the proper procedure to be followed. (paras 15,16, 18 & 19 )

       Held = Two days prior to the date of the impugned notice he issued an order of suspension of the plaintiff. According to the statement of Mr. Gupta that order was passed on certain complaints against the plaintiff but what was that complaint which necessitated the suspension order to be issued has not been brought on the record nor did the defendant try to prove as to what action on that complaint was taken against the plaintiff. Even after the impugned notice was served on the plaintiff, the suspension order continued and was nut revoked by the appointing authority even though no regular enquiry was instituted against the plaintiff. It means that the plaintiff remained under suspension till he relinquished the charge of his post which means that both the remedies were being simultaneously pursued No light is thrown by the defendant State Govt as to how the disciplinary proceeding contemplated or initiated against the plaintiff were pursued. The continuation of the suspension order without any disciplinary proceeding for such a long time till the service of the plaintiff was finally terminated on 5/05/1966 by itself shows that the appointing authority was not proceeding against the plaintiff in a bona fide manner. In such circumstances the order cannot be said to have been issued in a bonafide manner. (paras 21 & 22 )

TYAGI, J.—This second appeal of the State defendant is against the judgment and decree dated 6th December, 1972 of the Additional District Judge, Ajmer confirming the decree passed by the Munsif, Ajmer District, Ajmer declaring the order of termination of the plaintiff-respondents service as illegal and passing a decree for Rs. 3,400/- for the arrears of salary till the date of the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

The facts giving rise to this litigation, in a nut shell, are as follows:

Plaintiff Jagdish Chandra Heda was appointed as an L.D.C. in the office of the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) Excise and Taxation by order dated 20th April, 1963. The appointment was temporary. It is admitted by the parties that Shri Jagdish Chandra took charge of the post of L.D.C. on 22nd April, 1963. Later on Jagdish Chandra was transferred to the office of the Sales Tax Officer Survey and Investigation, Ajmer against a clear vacant post of an L.D.C. and thereafter he was again transferred to the office of the Sales Tax Officer, Ajmer City, Ajmer. According to the case of the plaintiff the plaintiffs initial appointment was made by the Deputy Commissioner Excise and later on it was extended by him to continue till further orders. On 22nd March, 1966 the Commercial Taxes Officer Ajmer, Mr. R. D. Gupta passed an order suspending the plaintiff. Two days after i.e. on 4th March, 1966, a notice was given to the plaintiff respondent that his temporary service shall stand terminated with effect from 5th May, 1966. This notice was served on the plaintiff on 5th April, 1966. The plaintiff was relieved of his duties on 5th May, 1966. The plaintiff sought his remedy by preferring and appeal to the Deputy Commissioner (Administration) challenging the order of suspension and the notice of termination but the plaintiffs appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner (Excise). The plaintiff again filed an appeal before the Government. But his grievance is that the Government did not take any decision on his appeal, therefore, he was compelled to file a suit in the court of Munsiff Ajmer City East, Ajmer for a declara-tion that the notice of termination was illegal and hence he should be deemed to be in service even after 5th May, 1966. In these circumstances the plaintiff prayed that a decree for Rs. 3,400/- for arrears of pay be passed against the State treating him in service after the date of termination. One of the grounds of the challenge was that the order of termination of service of the plaintiff was passed by Mr. R. D. Gupta who bore an ill will against the plaintiff as he had appeared against Mr. Gupta as a witness in a departmental enquiry and, therefore, the impugned order was mala fide.

3. The State denied the charge of malafides and came out with a plea that the plaintiff had no right to file a suit as he was a temporary employee of the State and under R. 23A of RSR. the Commercial Taxes Officer was competent to terminate the plaintiffs services after giving him one moth notice. It was, therefore, prayed in the written statement that the suit of the plaintiff be dismissed with costs.

4. The trial court framed as many as 7 issues out of which issue No. 1 relates to the illegality and unconstitutionality of the termination order and also about the mala fides of Mr. Gupta.

5. The plaintiff besides himself produced two witnesses while the State examin-ed only Mr. Rameshwar Das Gupta, Commercial Officer, Ajmer.

6. The learned Munsiff held that the order of termination was void because the plaintiff was in continuous service of the Government for more than 3 years at the time when he was actually removed and, therefore, R. 23A(l) which was pressed into service was not attracted to terminate the plaintiffs services. According to the learned Munsif it was R. 23A(2) of the RSR which could be attracted in the circumstances of this case. He also held that the order of termination was passed by an authority who was not competent under Art. 311 of the Co






































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