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1976 Supreme(Raj) 97

Rajasthan High Court
Rajindar Sachar, J.
Bherulal - Appellant
Versus
The State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur - Respondents
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1381 of 1976
Decided On : August 27, 1976

Advocates Appeared:
R.R. Vyas, for Petitioner; H.N. Kalla, Dy. Govt. Advocate; R.N. Munshi, for Respondent No. 3

Headnote:(a) Constitution of India, Art. 226—Finding fact by Tribunal in petitioners version—High Court will not interfere.(b) Motor Vehicles Act, S. 64 A—Where party by its own fault has disentitled itself to file appeal there can be no revision.(c) Constitution of India, Art. 226—Court cannot issue mandamus to compel a body to exercise discretion in particular way.(d) Constitution of India, Art. 226—Where order of Tribunal has acquired finality High Court will interfere only in gravely exceptional cases—where, petitioner failed to avail of alternative remedy High Court will not interfere.(e) Constitution of India, Art 226—Regional Transport Authority passing a firm order after considering all aspects—Order cannot be said to be without applying the mind(f) Motor Vehicles Act, S. 62 (1)(c) —Regional Transport Authority making order after taking alt facts into consideration—It cannot be said that authority had not applied mind.

       A person who by his own fault has disentitled himself from filing an appeal by not having opposed the grant of a permit when he had the full opportunity to do so, cannot be allowed to avail the remedy of revision, which only lies, where no appeal lies. (Para 8)

       Whether the Tribunal should exercise its revisional Power suo moto is a question of discretion and it is pointless to urge that this Court should compel the Tribunal to exercise its discretion. It is patent that no mandamus can lie to compel a body to exercise its discretion in a particular manner unless the refusal to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction is vitiated by mala fide or is based on irrelevant ground or extraneous consideration. (Para 9)

       The order of Tribunal dismissing his revision petition has put a stamp of finality on the order of the Regional Transport Authority. To allow him to urge against the order of respondent No. 2 when the order of respondent No. 1 is in the field) would lead to anomalous result, because if this court was to set aside the order of respondent No. 2, there will still remain the order of respondent No 1 affirming the order of respondent No. 2 and in that case a problem will be created for the authorities in forcing them to choose between the order of this Court and the appellate Tribunal

       In number of cases it has been held that if the order of the regional Transport Authority is without jurisdiction this Court may interfere even without the party having availed of the alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision But I have no doubt that it is only in gravely exceptional cases that this court will entertain a writ petition direct and in normal course it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to entertain it, if a party has not availed of the remedy of appeal or revision, more especially as the matters which are necessarily contentious can be examined more satisfactorily by the authorities constituted under the Act. Moreover the present case where the petitioner did avail the remedy of revision but ultimately it is found not to have been a proper remedy cannot be equated with a case where the petitioner chooses to invoke this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance (Para 10 & 11)

       The regional Transport Authority has considered the various circumstances and has definitely given a finding that there is a large traffic on this route and that it was for the convenience of the travelling public that further vehicle be provided for a temporary period and that the grant of a permit would be for the convenience of the public 1 do not see how under the circumstances it can be said that there has been no application of the mind by the regional Transport Authority and no finding by it that a particular temporary need exists. The clause "to meet a particular temporary need" is not to be given any special or restricted meaning. In each case it will have to be found whether a particular temporary need exists or not. (Para 18)

SACHAR, J.—By this petition under Article 226 the petitioner challenges the impugned resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur respondent 2 dated 28.6.76 granting a temporary stage carriage permit in favour of respondent 3 as well as the order dated 2.8.76 of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal respondent I which rejected the revision of the petitioner as not maintainable.

2. There is a route known as Bhilwara-Jahazpur via Bigod-Kachola diversion via Begod Mandalgarh. Originally the scope fixed on this route was of 3 stage carriages to perform 2 return trips. The Regional Transport Authority sought to increase it to 5 stage carriages to perform 3 return trips in the year 1970 but a revision against that was allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which maintaining the increase of return trips to 3 but reduced the increased scope of stage carriages from 8 to 4. The scope thus fixed on the route came to be 4 stage carriages to perform 3 return trips. One of the existing operators on this route filed a petition being Civil Writ No. 1879 of 74 in this Court with the result that no non-temporary stage carriage permit was granted by the Regional Transport Authority against the one vacancy which had arisen by the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. That writ petition was dismissed on 20.4.76 by this Court. In the meanwhile in October, 1976 the scheme of notified route of Bhilwara to Bundi came to be implemented. The petitioner who was operating on the Bhilwara Jahazpur route accordingly had his permit curtailed of or the portion from Bhilwara to Triveni Chauraya. The Petitioner is thus now operating on the curtailed route from Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur, a distance of 40 miles. The previous uncurtailed route from Bhilwara to Jahazpur was about 76 miles.

3 On 26.6 76 respondent 3 applied for the grant of the temporary permit under sec. 62 of the Act. In the column meant for the purpose for which permit was required it was stated "public convenience to meet a particular temporary need". The route mentioned was Bhilwara to Jahazpur via Bagod-Mandalgarh-Triveni Chauraya Kac-hola curtailed Bhilwara to Triveni Chauraya because portion of section 68D now Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpur. The said application was taken up for consideration by the respondent 2 in its meeting of 28.6.76. It was decided that respondent 3 may be given a temporary permit for four months from Triveni Chauraya to Jahazpura via Kachola in the existing vacancy. The petitioner being aggrieved against the grant of a temporary permit to respondent 3 filed a revision under section 64 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, (hereinafter to be called the Act). Respondent 1 however by the impugned order accepted the preliminary objection of the respondent 3 that as the petitioner could have filed an appeal under sec. 64(1)(f) of the Act and as he had failed to avail of that remedy revision under sec. 64A was not maintainable. The petitioner has come up in writ petition against both the orders of respondents 1 and 2.

4. Sec. 64A provides that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may either on its own motion or on application made to it call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deem fit. It is apparent that sec 64A can be invoked only in which no appeal lies. If therefore an appeal is maintainable, jurisdiction under sec. 64A cannot be invoked by an applicant.

5. The appellate provision is to be found in sec. 64(1)(f) which lays down that any person being, a local authority or a police authority or an association which or a person providing transport facilities who having opposed the grant of a permit is aggriev























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