GUPTA, J. — This writ petition deserves to be dismissed as the grounds sought to be raised therein already stand concluded by this Court and the Supreme Court.

2. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) published a draft scheme for the nationalisation of Dungarpur-Peeth route under section 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The aforesaid draft scheme was published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated April 3, 1976 inviting objections in respect thereof from the concerned operators. The petitioner and several others raised objections. The Joint Legal Remembrancer No. II, Government of Rajasthan, who is empowered to hear the objections in respect of the draft schemes of nationalisation on behalf of the State Government, under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 68-D of the Act, decided some of the objections stayled as preliminary objections by his order dated September 25, 1976. The matter is yet to be heard and decided on merits by the aforesaid Joint Legal Remembrancer. The present writ petition has been filed in this Court challenging the order passed by the Joint Legal Remembrancer on September 25, 1976.

3. Mr. Munshi has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this writ petition, namely that the order passed by the Joint Legal Remembrancer is an interlocutory order and his submission is that this Court should not entertain a writ petition against such an interlocutory order. As I have heard the learned counsel for the parties on merits I consider it proper to dispose of the writ petition on merits rather than to reject the same on the aforesaid preliminary objection raised by Mr. Munshi.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed only two grounds before me out of the five preliminary objections, which appear to have been raised before the Joint Legal Remembrancer. The first contention raised by the learned counsel is that although the Joint Legal Remembrancer has agreed to issue summons to help the objectors in securing the attendance of their witnesses, yet he has held that he has no power to compel the witnesses to attend and give evidence before him in the proceedings under sub section (2) of section 68-D of the Act and in view of the aforesaid order of the Joint Legal Remembrancer, there would be no effective hearing in the matter. This contention, which is now sought to be raised again before this Court has already been rejected twice by their Lordships of the Supreme Court on earlier occasions. In M/s. Nehru Motor Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. vs. the State of Rajas than (1) and in Capital Multi-Purpose Co-operative Societies Bhopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2), their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled similar contentions advanced before them that without the help of the coercive process to secure the attendance of a witness, there could be no effective hearing under section 68-D of the Act. In the case of Nehru Motor Transport (1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe as follows in this connection,—

"As to the contention that the Rules do not provide for compelling the attendance of witnesses and all that the Legal Remembrancer can do is to summon witnesses who may or may not appear in answer to the summonses, it is enough to say that the proceedings before the Legal Remembrancer though quasi-judicial are not exactly like proceedings in Court, In proceedings of this kind, it may very well be concluded when a witness is summoned and does not appear, that he does not wish to give evidence, and that may be the reason why no provision is made in the Rules for any coercive process. We think in the circumstances of the hearing to be given by the Legal Remembrancer, it is enough if he takes evidence of the witnesses whom the objectors bring before him themselves and if he helps them to secure their attendance by issue of summonses. But the fact that the Rules do not provide for coerci

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