JOSHI, J —In these six writ petitions each of the petitioners seek to challenge the impugned judgment of the Board of Revenue passed in each case and pray for quashing the impugned judgment in respective cases.

2. Each of the petitioners had obtained decree in his favour which was not appealed against and the decree became final. Despite appeals having not been filed against the respective decree the Collector made reference under sec. 232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, hereinafter called the Tenancy Act for setting aside the decrees passed in various suits in favour of the respective petitioners. The Revenue Board entertained the reference and set aside the respective decrees. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners challenge the judgment of the Revenue Board in these cases and pray for quashing the same.

3. The petitioners have challenged the judgment of the Revenue Board amongst other on the ground that neither the Collector was competent to make a reference under sec. 232 for setting aside the decree nor the Revenue Board was competent to entertain such reference under sec. 232 of the Tenancy Act. As this point of law is common to all the writ petitions, the petitions are being disposed of together by a common judgment.

4. It has been strenuously urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that it was not within the competence of the Collector to make a reference under sec. 232 of the Tenancy Act for setting aside the decree as the decrees do not fall within the purview of sec. 232. It has been submitted that reference under sec. 232 can be made for setting aside the order only and not for setting aside the decrees.

5. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the respondent that sec. 232 should not be given a narrow meaning as it is comprehensive in nature and it covers the case of decree also. Consequently it has been urged that the Collector was fully competent to make the reference for cancelling the decree and so also the Board of Revenue was competent to entertain the reference and set aside the decree.

6. The main controversy in this case centres round the question as to whether a reference can be made under sec. 232 of the Tenancy Act by the Collector for varying, cancelling or reversing the decree passed in revenue suit, although appeal lay against such decree but no appeal was filed against it, and whether the Revenue Board was competent on such reference to vary, cancel or reverse the decree.

7. Before answering the question it will be useful to have a survey of the relevant provisions of the Act which have got bearing on the controversy before us. Sec. 208 of he Tenancy Act makes the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the suits and proceedings under the Tenancy Act with certain reservations. There are certain exceptions. One exception is that provisions of the C.P.C which are inconsistent with anything in the Tenancy Act then such provisions shall not be applicable so far as the inconsistency extends. Sec. 208 may be reproduced as under: —

"208. Application of Civil Procedure Code: The Provision of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), except:—

(a) provisions inconsistent with anything in this Act, so far as the inconsistency extends.

(b) provisions applicable only to special suits or proceedings outside the scope of this Act, and

(c) provisions contained in List I of the Fourth Schefule, shall apply to all suits and proceedings under this Act, subject to the modifications contained in List II of the Fourth Schefule."

We may now refer to sec. 222 of the Act. This section lays down that no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any Revenue Court except provided in this Act. Sec. 223 mkes provision for appeals from original decrees. Sec. 224 makes provisions for appeals from appellate decrees. Sec. 225 deals with appeals from orders. It will be useful to reproduce sec. 225 as under:—

"225. Appeals from orders:— (1) An appeal shall lie from an orde

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