N.M. KASLIWAL, J — This writ petition by the petitioners Chhaganlal and Hukam Chand under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against (he judgment of the Board of Revenue dated December 21, 1981.

2. The brief facts leading to this writ petition are that a declaration was filed by Chhakanlal and his brother Gopal regarding their land under the ceiling proceedings. In the said declaration Chhaganlal had declared Hukam-Chand as his grand-son. Gopal had also not mentioned that Hukam Chand was his adopted son. The matter went upto the Board of Revenue and the case was remanded by the Board of Revenue with the direction that the question whether Hukamchand was the adopted son of Gopal should be decided after making enquiry in this regard. After the remand of the case the petitioners led oral and documentary evidence and the learned Assistant Collector Baran after taking into consideration the entire evidence arrived at the conclusion that the petitioners had not proved the adoption of Hukam Chand, The appeal filed by the petitioners was also dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, and the Board of Revenue by the impugned judgment dated December 21, 1981, uphold the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority. Thus there is a concurrent finding of all the courts including the Board of Revenae that the adoption of Hukam Chand by Gopal is not proved.

3. Mr. Luhadia, learned counsel for the petitioner tried to assail the finding of the Board of Revenue with regard to adoption but we are clearly of opinion that the [Board of Revenue has given cogent reasons after taking into consideration the entire evidence led in this regard that the adoption of Hukam-Chand is not proved. That apart, it is purely a finding of fact which cannot be assailed in the exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4. It was next contended by Mr. Luhadia that the question of adoption was a civil right and the authority under the Ceiling Act had no right to determine this question. It was further contended in this regard that under section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act only suits and applications of the nature specified in the third schedule shall be heard and determined by the Revenue courts. Attention was also invited to section 239 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which lays down that if in any suit or proceeding in a revenue court a question of proprietary right in respect of land forming the subject matter of such suit or proceeding is raised and such question has not previously been determined by a civil court of competent jurisdiction, the revenue court shall frame an issue on the question of proprietary right and submit the record to he competent civil court for the decision of that issue only. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions it is contended that the question of adoption was a matter relating to proprietary right in respect of land forming the subject-matter and as such the revenue courts under the Ceiling Act had no right to decide the said question and the matter ought to have been referred to the civil court of competent jurisdiction for its decision. In our view there is no force in the aforesaid contention. So far as section 207 is concerned it has no application at all because it makes mention of only suits and applications of the nature specified in the third schedule of the Tenancy Act. The dispute relating to ceiling did not fall in any of the suits and applications mentioned in the third schedule, arid the third schedule of Tenancy Act has no application at all to the matters arising under the ceiling law. So far section 239 is concerned, that also relates to the suits and applications arising under the Tenancy Act. It was contended in this regard by the learned counsel for the petitioners that before coming into force of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973, the provisions relating to ceiling matters were incorporated in Chapter III B under the

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