S.S. BYAS, J.—This civil second appeal of the obstructed is directed against an order of the Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer dated January 5, 1983, by which their appeal was dismissed and the order of Munsif, Ajmer City, Ajmer dated February 25, 1978 passed in a proceeding under Order 21 rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure was up held.

2. Very few facts need narration for the disposal of this appeal. Smt. Kalan Bai (respondent No. 1) instituted a suit for rent and eviction against the other respondent Khem Chand. The suit was decreed ex-parte in her favour. She applied for the execution of decree and prayed for the issue of a warrant of delivery of possession of the property in dispute to her. The Court of Munsif issued the warrant for the delivery of possession and the bailiff went on the spot for this purpose on February 10, 1974. The appellants were found in possession of the property and they refused to deliver the possession to the decree-holder. They, thus, caused the obstruction in the execution of decree and resisted the delivery of possession on February 10, 1974. The decree-holder again applied for a fresh writ for the delivery of possession under O. 21 r. 35, C.P.C. When the bailiff went on the spot on July 12, 1975, the appellants again resisted the execution of decree and refused to deliver the possession of the property to the decree-holder. The warrant of delivery of possession thus remained unexecuted. The decree-holder thereupon submitted an application under O. 21 r. 97, C.P.C. on August 11, 1975, complaining the resistance and praying for the removal of the obstruction caused by the appellants. The learned Munsif initiated an enquiry and issued notices to the appellants. The defence taken by the appellants was that they were not bound by the decree; their possession over the property in dispute was an old one and that the application of the decree-holder filed on August 11, 1975 was time-barred. It was contended that the first resistance by them took place on February 10, 1974. The application under O. 21 r. 97, C.P.C. should have been filed within 30 days from February 10, 1974. The successive obstruction caused by them on July 12, 1975 did not give rise to any fresh cause of action. The application of the decree-holder under O. 21 rule 97, C.P.C. was thus time barred. The learned Munsif, after holding an enquiry, recorded his finding as under:—

(1) the appellants were the sub-tenants of the judgment-debtor Khem-chand and the resistance offered by them was without just cause; and

(2) the application filed by the decree-holder under O. 21 r. 97, C.P.C. was not time barred. It was within limitation.

3. The cause of action for preferring an application under O. 21 r. 97, C.P.C. accrued also on July 12, 1975 when the second resistance was made. The application could not be said to be time barred because of the obstruction caused by the obstructors (appellants) earlier also on February 10, 1974. According to the learned Munsiff, every successive resistance offered by the appellants gave a fresh cause of action to the decree-holder. He, therefore, allowed the decree-holders application and directed that the possession of the property in dispute be delivered to the decree-holder by removing the obstruction caused by the appellants. Aggrieved against the said order, the appellants went in appeal, which was heard and decided by the learned Additional Civil Judge. The same contentions, which were placed before the learned Munsif, were re-agitated in appeal. The learned Additional Civil Judge found no force in the contentions of the appellants. He concurred with the view taken by the Munsiff. The appeal was consequently dismissed. They have now come up in second appeal.

4. The following substantial questions of law were formulated while admitting the appeal :—

(1) Whether the period of limitation for an application under order 21 r. 97, C.P.C. for directing to deliver possession in the case of resistances or obstruction co

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