NAVIN CHANDRA SHARMA, J. — I have heard V.S. Chaudhary for the petitioner and Mr. Rajendra Vyas Public Prosecutor in this revision.

2. The only contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the complaint in the instant case was presented in the trial court by Shri Surendra Kumar Assistant Public Prosecutor and not by the Food Inspector. He urged that no cognizance could be taken by the Judicial Magistrate Gulabpura on the complaint presented by the Assistant Public Prosecutor. This argument has advanced before the trial court by stating that the complaint was filed by the Food Inspector through the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutors are appointed under section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for conducting any prosecution on behalf of the Central Government or the State Government. No order was produced before me to show that the State Government had appointed Shri Surendra Kumar as an Assistant Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for conducting the cases under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act in which complaint is filed by the Food Inspector and not by the State Government. Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, provides that no prosecution for an offence under the Act (not being an offence under section 14 or section 14A) shall be instituted except by or with a written consent of the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order by the State Government. lt appears from the judgment of the trial court that the Food Inspector had obtained the consent of the District Magistrate Bhilwara for filing the complaint. This goes to show that the Food Inspector himself had not been authorised by general or special order of the State Government to institute a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. It was only the District Magistrate Bhilwara who had been authorised in this behalf by the State Government. The District Magistrate Bhilwara could either himself institute a prosecution for an offence under the said Act or give written consent to any other person for instituting the prosecution. The District Magistrate Bhilwara had in the instant case given consent to Shri Shyam Lal Bhati Food Inspector to institute the complaint. It was thus Shri Shyam Lal Bhati alone who could institute the prosecution and not the Assistant Public Prosecutor.

3. Reference may be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A.K. Rai vs. State of Punjab (I). In that case the Punjab State Government had in Rule 3 of the Punjab Rules provided that the State Government may delegate its powers to institute prosecution for an offence under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and such other powers exercisable by it under the Act as may he specified in the order of the Food (Health) Authority of the State of Punjab. In exercise of this delegation, the Food (Health) Authority issued a notification on September 7, 1972 authorising the Food Inspector to institute a prosecution against the person committing offence under the Act. On a construction of Rule 3 of the Punjab Rules their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that if Rule 3 is liberally interpreted the words "authorised the launching of prosecutions may lead to the consequence that the Food (Health) Authority who had been delegated the power of the State Government under sec. 20 (1) of the Act could in its turn sub-delegate its powers to the Food Inspector. That went against the specific provisions contained in section 20 (1) of the Act. It was held that the notification of the Food (Health) authority \, ultra vires in so far as he purported to delegate the powers to the prosecution for an offence under the Act under sec. 20(1) to the Food Inspector, Farid-kot. In the present case, there is no question of sub-delegation of the power of the State Government. The delegation has been made by the State Government to the District Magistrate, Bhilwara. All

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