1993 Supreme(Raj) 249
Rajasthan High Court
Honble RAJESH Balia, J.
Legal Representative of Ghasi Ram and Others - Appellant
Versus
Laxminarain and Others - Respondents
S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 480 of 1991
Decided On : August 05, 1993
R.R. Nagori, for Petitioner B.M. Singhvi, for Respondents
Headnote:C.P.C., Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 - Trial Court granted injunction restraining the decree holder from execution of decree — No prima facie case exists — There is no fraud or mala fide in respect of obtaining the decree against judgment debtors — No irreparable injury caused — Temporary injunction cannot be granted. (Para 8 & 9)
(2). Respondents Laxminarayan and Satyanarain had filed a suit for rent eviction against Deva Ram son of Shri Sitaram and Bhanwarlal son of Shri Deva Ram. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on 27.2.76 which was affirmed in appeal on 31st July 1982. The decree for possession was put for execution by the decree-holders against judgment debtors Deva Ram & Bhanwar Lal. During the pendency of execution application after the warrant of poss-ession was issued, Gheesa Ram filed, a suit for declaration of his title against the decree holders as well as judgment debtors and for permanent injunction of restraining the decree holders from dispossessing the plaintiff in execution of the decree. An application for temporary injunction under order 39 rules 1 & 2 CPC was also filed the trial court by its order dated 3.8.84 granted a temporary injunction restraining the decree holders from executing the decree in their favour for possession of the suit premises.
(3). On appeal the learned Additional District Judge found by discussing the material on record that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and prima facie it appears that plaintiff was put in possession by the judgment debtors for abstracting the execution of decree. For arriving at its conclusion the appellate court relied on the report of Assistant Nazir dt, 7.8.83 according to which on that date the premises in question were unoccupied and were in a dilapidated condition, and on that date judgement debts have refused to deliver to possession. However, when after the report warrant of possession was issued on 11.8.83 with direction to secure the possession of premises in p73 question through police-aid.
The present suit has been filed by Gheesa Ram, who is near relation of the judgement debtors and according to the material available on record in the form of Ration Cards is person living jointly with the judgement debtors. A part from this material the lower appellate court has also taken into consideration the affidavits filed by both the parties.
(4) Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the lower appellate court had not discussed the reasoning given by the trial court; while granting the injunction, and was not entitled to reverse the order of the trial court merely because it cames to a different conclusion on the same material. He also contends that if the decree holders would have aged a complaint under Or. 21 rule 97, the plaintiff could to have been evicted without determination of his objections and therefore his position cannot be worst, because he has chosen to file a suit of declaration of title.
(5). Having carefully considered the arguments raised before me, I am of the opinion that the revision has no merit.
(6). It may be noticed while the lower appellate court has referred to report of the Assistant Nazir dt. 7.8.83 about the state of occupancy of the premises on 7.8.83 and refusal of judgment debtors to peacefully and voluntarily deliver the possession the trial court has relied on the report of the Assistant Nazir on warrant of possession issued on 11.8.83. The trial court ignored the fact that the warrant of possession was issued only after the judgement debtor has refused to deliver the possession of the suit property which was found to be vacant on 7.8.83 and not in occupation of anyone from this material document the conclusion is irresistible that prima facie the. plain tiff has been put in possession or come in possession after 7.8.83 and after the judgement debtor has refused to deliver the possession of the house which was lying vacant on 7.8.83 in execution of decree in question. This clearly establishes that lower appellate court has not rev