Supreme Court
Honble A.S. ANAND & M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.
Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj and Another - Appellant
Versus
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Another - Respondents
Criminal Appeals Nos. 1183 & 1184 of 1995
Decided On : October 12, 1995
At the time of taking cognizance the Court has to exercise its judicial discretion it necessarily follows that if in a given case, as the present one, the complainant, as the person aggrieved raises objections to the acceptance of a police report which recommends discharge of the accused and seeks to satisfy the Court that a case for taking cognizance was made out, but the Court overrules such objections, it is just and desirable that the reasons therefor be recorded. Necessity to give reasons which disclose proper appreciation of the issues before the Court needs no emphasis. Reasons introduced clarity and minimise chances of arbitrariness. That necessarily means that recording of reasons will not be necessary when the Court accepts such police report without any demur from the complainant. As the order of the learned Magistrate in the instant case does not contain any reason whatsoever, even though it was passed after hearing the objections of the complainant it has got to be set aside and we do hereby set it aside. (Para 27)
The High Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the probability, reliability or genuineness of the allegation made therein. Of course as has been pointed out in Bhajan Lals case (supra) an FIR or a complaint may be quashed if the allegations made therein are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but the High Court has not recorded such a finding obviously because on the allegation in the FIR it was not possible to do so. (Para 22)
It may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, (2). Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Sec. 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Sec. 155(2) of the Code, (3). Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused, (4). Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Sec. 155(2) of the Code, (5). Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, (6). Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. and (7). Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. (Para 7)
Needless to say ``the common notions of mainkind referred to by the learned Judge have to be gauged by contemporary societal standards. The other learned Judge (Bachawat J.) observed that the essence of a womans modesty is her sex and from her very birth \she possesses the modesty which is the attribute of her sex. From the above dictionary meaning of `modesty and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singhs case (supra) it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. When the above test is applied in the present case, keeping in view the total fact situation, it cannot but be held that the alleged act of Mr. Gill in slapping Mrs. Bajaj on her posterior amounted to `out-raging of her modesty for it was not only an affront to the normal sense of feminine decency but also an affront to the dignity of the lady ``sexual overtones or not, notwithstanding. (Para 14)
It is undoubtedly correct that if intention or knowledge is one of the ingredients of any offence, it has got to be proved like other ingredients for convicting a person. But, it is also equally true that those ingredients being state of mind may not be proved by direct evidence and may have to be inferred from the attending circumstances of given case. (Para 16)
(2). These two appeals have been heard together as they arise out of one and the same incident. Facts leading to these appeals and relevant for their disposal are as under :
``On July 29, 1988, Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj, an Officer of the Indian Administrative Service (I.A.S.) belonging to the Punjab Cadre and then working as the Special Secretary, Finance, lodged a complaint with the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh Union Territory alleging commission of offences under Secs. 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (``IPC for short) by Mr. K.P.S. Gill, the Director General of Police, Punjab on July 18,1988 at a dinner party. Treating that complaint as the First Information Report (FIR) a case was registered by the Central Police Station, Sector 17, Chandigarh and investigation was taken up. Thereafter on November 22, 1988, her husband Mr. B.R. Bajaj, who also happens to be a senior I.A.S. officer of the Punjab Cadre, lodged a complaint in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate for the same offences, alleging, inter-alia, that Mr. Gill being a high-ranking Police
Officer of the Chandigarh Police had neither arrested him in connection with the case registered by the Police on his wifes complaint nor conducted investigation in fair and impartial manner and apprehending that the Police would conclude the investigation by treating the case as untraced he was filing the complaint. On receipt of the complaint the Chief Judicial Magistrate transferred it to a Judicial Magistrate for disposal and the latter, in view of the fact that an investigation by the Police was in progress in relation to the same offences, called for a report from the Investigating Officer in accordance with Sec. 210 of
Code of Criminal Procedure (``Cr.P.C. for short). In the meantime-on December 16, 1988 to be precise-Mr. Gill moved the High Court by filing a petition under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C. for quashing the FIR and the complaint. On that petition an interim order was passed staying the investigation into the FIR lodged by Mrs. Bajaj, but not the proceedings initiated on the complaint of Mr. Bajaj. Resultantly, the learned Judicial Magistrate proceeded with the complaint case and examined the complainant and the witnesses produced by him. Thereafter, Mr. Bajaj moved an application before the learned Magistrate for summoning Mr. Y.S. Ratra, an I.A.S. Officer of the Government of Punjab and Mr. J.F. Rebeiro, Adviser to the Governor of Punjab for being examined as witnesses on his behalf and for producing certain documents, which was allowed. Instead of appearing personally, the above two Officers sought for exem- tion from appearance, and the District Attorney, after producing the documents, filed an application claiming privilege under Secs. 123/124 of the Evidence Act in respect of them. The learned Magistrate rejected the prayer of the above two officers and also rejected after going through the documents, the claim of privilege, being of the opinion that the documents did not concern the affairs of the State. Assailing the order of the learned Magistrate rejecting the claim of privilege, the State of Punjab filed a Criminal Revision Petition which was allowed by the High Court by its Order dated January 24, 1989. The peti- tion earlier filed by Mr. Gill under Sec. 482 Cr. P.C. came up for hearing before the High Court thereafter and was allowed by its order dated May 29,1989 and both the FIR and the complaint were quashed. The above two orders of the High Court are under challenge in these appeals at the instance of Mr. and Mrs.
Bajaj. Of the two appeals we first proceed to consider the merits of the one preferred against quashing of the FIR and the complaint (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2358 of 1989) for, in case it fails, the other appeal (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1361 of 1989) would, necessarily, be infructuous.
(3). On perusal of the impug
2. State of Punjab vs. Major Singh
4. Veeda Menezes vs. Yusuf Khan (AIR 1966 SC 1773)
5. Bhagwant Singh vs. Commissioner of Police (AIR 1985 SC 1285)
6. Abhinandan Jha vs. Dinesh Mishra (AIR 1968 SC 117)
7. H.S. Bains vs. State (AIR 1980 SC 1883)
1. State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335)
3. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra ((1994) 4 SCC 602)
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