Honble YADAV, J. – Instant Review Petition has been filed for recalling and reviewing my order dated 29.1.97 passed in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 20 of 1989 dismissing the appeal summarily as it was found to be concluded by concurrent finding of facts recorded by both the courts-below and no substantial question of law was involved.

(2). The aforesaid second appeal was filed on behalf of the appellants by their counsel Mr. L.R. Mehta and Mr. Rajendra Mehta. The said appeal was argued by Mr. Rajendra Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant and after hearing him, the appeal was dismissed summarily as stated above.

(3). Now, the appellant-petitioners have decided to change their counsel and instead of Mr. L.R. Mehta and Mr. Rajendra Mehta, they preferred to file the present review petition by engaging Mr. H.C. Jain and Mr. S.C. Maloo as their counsel.

(4). It is urged by Mr. H.C. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioners that while I was dismissing the second appeal on the aforesaid ground that my own decision rendered in case of Chetan Dass vs. Anushuiya (1), was not brought to my notice by their counsel engaged by the appellant-petitioners.

(5). I am of the view that the provisions relating to power of review envisaged under O.47 R.1, CPC constitute an exception to the general rule to the effect that once a judgment is signed and pronounced, it cannot afterwards be altered. Thus, power to review is exercisable only where the circumstances are distinctly covered by the statutory exceptions contemplated under O. 47 R. 1 CPC.

(6). A close scrutiny of the provisions envisaged under O. 47 R. 1, CPC revealed that any person considering himself aggrieved is entitled to move an application for review of a decree or; order from which a statutory appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred; by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed or by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes and who from discovery of a new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or for any other sufficient reason desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him.

(7). Indisputably, the aforesaid argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioners Mr. H.C. Jain does not fall within the scope of the grounds enumerated under O.47 R. 1, CPC. It is urged by Mr. Jain that his aforesaid argument is squarely covered within the expression after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the appellant-petitioners when the appeal was dismissed summarily on 29.1.1997.

(8). The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioners is attractive but fallacious. Once the appellant-petitioners engaged counsel on their choice on their behalf to do `Pairvi in the second appeal, the learned counsel so engaged by them step into their shoes and arguments advanced by them shall be treated to be argument advanced by the appellant- petitioners themselves by extending the principle of legal fiction. To my mind, not to bring to the notice of the Court the decision rendered in case of Chetan Dass (supra) while dismissing the second appeal summarily does not fall within the exception as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioners in the present case for altering the decision taken on 29.1.97.

(9). In my considered opinion, the expression ``new and important matter used under O. 47 R. 1 CPC should be interpreted about discovery of some evidence having clinching bearing on the merit of the case in hand and not a decision having affect of precedent in existence on the date of delivery of judgment but not brought to the notice of the Court. I am also of the view that if interpretation of the aforesaid expression is taken as suggested by the learned coun

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