Honble SHAH, J.–Leave granted.

(2). The appellant-wife contends that she had married to Rajinder Singh-respondent No. 2 on December 9, 1990. Her parents were resident of Delhi and the marriage was performed at Delhi. A daughter was born on 19.12.1991. It is her contention that on 19.01.1992, she was thrown out from the matrimo-nial home in Patiala with 4 weeks baby girl and that at that time, she had only wearing apparel.

(3). On the same day, that is, 19.01.1992 at 3.40 p.m., a complaint bearing No. DD. 18 was lodged by her at P.S. Kotwali, Patiala making various allegations of torture and dowry demand against her husband and parents-in-law. Thereafter, she came to Delhi to live with her parents. Within that time also, threats by her husband continued. On 30.04.1992, a complaint was lodged against her husband in the Women Cell, Delhi. Subsequently, on 23.01.1993, the impugned FIR No. 34 of 1993 under Sections 406 and 498A I.P.C. for the alleged occurrence dated 9.12.1990 at Patiala was lodged at Police Station, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi. Rajinder Singh, respondent No. 2 was arrested on 4.02.1993 at Patiala and certain recoveries were effected and he was brought to Delhi and produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, who remanded him to judicial custody and, thereafter, released him on bail on 9.02.1993.

(4). Thereafter, the husband (R-2) filed petition in Delhi High Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the FIR No. 34 of 1993 on the ground that the allegations made in the complaint were false and mala fide and no part of the cause of action for investigation or trial of an offence arose within Delhi. On 12.10.1993, after hearing the Counsel for the parties, the High Court held ``since the return of stridhan and accounting thereof is being sought in Delhi, the Courts at Delhi will have the jurisdiction to try the case. Hence, the petition was dismissed. That order was challenged before this Court. By order da-ted 4.04.1995, the order passed by the High Court was set aside and matter was remitted for fresh consideration on the points raised by the respondent in the petition. This Court observed:

``The High Court dealt with only the territorial jurisdiction question and did not go into the merits of the matter. Ex-facie, it appears there a clear prayer of the appellant in his petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to the effect seeking proceedings to be quashed. The claim apparently is based on the aforesaid memorandum recorded at the Police Station, Patiala. In the face of it, it is claimed that criminal proceedings could not be initiated at Delhi after settling the matter out of

Court. As said before, there is no discussion on the merit of the matter in the order of the High Court.

(5). After remand, the High Court heard learned Counsel for the parties and quashed the F.I.R. on the ground that Investigating Officer at Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction. The Court further clarified that the alleged compromise arri-ved at between the parties on 19.1.1992 cannot be a ground for quashing the F.I.R. because it would depend upon the evidence which may be led by the parties with regard to the articles returned by the in-laws. That order is challenged before us in this appeal by special leave.

(6). At the time of hearing of this appeal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that after rightly holding that the alleged settlement of 19.1.1992 cannot be a ground for quashing the F.I.R., the High Court materially erred in holding that the alleged cause of action for lodging the F.I.R. had not arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi Police Station. He further pointed out that the matter was remanded by this Court for deciding the effect of the alleged settlement and the findings given by the High Court on the question of territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter by Delhi Police was not disturbed.

(7). As against thus, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the alleg

Click Here to Read the rest of this document