[Citation : RLW 2002 RJ 597]
(Rajasthan High Court)
Jaipur Bench
Maharao Brijraj Singh Vs. Saraswati Devi Sharma (Madan, J.)
HON'BLE ARUN MADAN, J.
Maharao Brijraj Singh & Anr.
Versus
Saraswati Devi Sharma
S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 100 of 2000, decided on 5th July, 2002
The contract for sale is a right being created in personal and not in estate. No privity in estate can be deduced therefrom, which may bind the Estate as in cases of mortgage, charge or lease. Merely personal right is created to the purchaser so as to seek specific performance which may ultimately bind any subsequent transferee who if any gets transfer of property with notice of agreement to sell, but till a decree for specific performance of a contract is obtained, the seller is entitled to full enjoyment of the property. Even otherwise if a decree for specific performance of a contract is obtained and no sale deed is actually executed, even then, it can also not been said that any interest in the suit property is vested. Thus viewed, no temporary injunction could have been granted at the instance of a person like the present plaintiff in whose favour the agreement to sell is executed till decree of specific performance is passed or obtained by him. (Para 22)
(b) C.P.C., Order 39 Rule 1 & 2; Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sec. 16 & 20; Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976, Sec. 20(2) and Contract Act, 1872, Sec. 23 — Suit for specific performance of agreement to sale — Oral agreement — Amount paid in lieu of sale consideration not proved — No prima facie case made out — Temporary injunction cannot be granted. (Paras 18 & 24)
Appeal allowed.
Trial court has committed a manifest error of law & jurisdiction in holding that the plaintiff-respondent has succeeded to establish prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury in her favour, therefore, she is entitled to obtain equitable discretionary relief of temporary injunction under O. 39 Rr. 1 & 2 CPC. As noticed above it has ignored aforesaid significant facts and circumstances besides legal aspects of the matter including the maintainability of suit for adjudging the prima facie case, which lead towards an irresistible conclusion that the plaintiff miserably failed to establish a clear and free from objection a prima facie case on equitable grounds. The learned trial Court has failed to take judicial notice of the mandatory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, Indian Contract Act, Transfer of Property Act, ULCAR Act, ULCAR (Repeal) Act, referred to in earlier part of this order, as well as mandatory provisions envisaged u/Sec. 10 read with Sec. 151 CPC which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. (Para 23)
.
(2). Plaintiff respondent instituted a suit seeking specific performance of contract & permanent injunction against Maharao Brijraj Singh & Thakur Prithvi Singh in respect of 80 bighas of agricultural land situated in village Rampura Tehsil Ladpura District Kota renown as Ummaid Vilas Enclave, bearing Khasra Nos. 433, 436 to 439, 440 to 489, 491, 492/684 and 546/691. In the plaint, it was admitted case that the suit land stood acquired by State Govt. under the Urban Land Ceiling & Regulation Act, 1976 (for brevity Ulcer Act) but by order dt. 24.2.90, it had been released from its acquisition with the stipulation that suit lands would be allotted to weaker sections of the society for constructing their houses after due sanction of the UIT Kota.
(3). The plaintiff sought specific performance of an oral agreement alleged to have been entered on 24.2.90 in between Bhim Singh (f/o Brijraj Singh defendant No.1) & plaintiff Saraswati Devi and whereby it was agreed that the plaintiff would pay Rs. 12 lacs to Maharao Bhim Singh who had to get sanction of construction & approval of the scheme from UIT Kota, and whereafter a sale deed pursuant to oral agreement to sell the suit land was to be executed & registered, so as to enable the plaintiff to carve out plots for allotments to the weaker sections of the society at cheaper rates as per State Govt.s order. Maharao Bhim Singh died in July, 1991. Brijraj Singh is son of Bhim Singh while Prithvi Singh was Private Secretary of Bhim Singh.
(4). In the plaint, it was also case of the plaintiff that pursuant to oral sale agreement, 80 bighas of suit land had been handed over by delivery of possession in her favour by Maharao Brijraj Singh, because she had paid sale consideration of Rs. 21 lacs on 26.2.90, Rs. 6 lacs on 8.3.90, Rs. 2 lacs on 15.3.90 & Rs. 2 lacs on 22.3.90 to Maharao Brij Raj Singh under its receipts issued by his agent & private Secretary Prithvi Singh (defendant No.2). But, the defendants did not execute and get registered a sale deed pursuant to oral sale agreement rather they kept on prevaricating and despite the fact that the plaintiff had been in cultivatory possession over the suit land since 1980 and after such an oral agreement to sale, his possession was as a purchaser, the defendant No.2 (Prithvi Singh) alongwith others attempted on 20.01.00 to take back forcibly possession of the suit land so as to dispossess therefrom and thereby the plaintiff had to lodge an FIR besides preferred to institute a suit for specific performance, alongwith temporary injunction.
(5). In written statement as well as reply to the T.I. application, the defendants denied to have entered into any oral sale agreement with the plaintiff, and further alleged that the receipts produced by the plaintiff are forged inasmuch as these receipts did not contain description of the land in dispute. The defendants contended inter alia that the suit land had been recorded in the names of Khatedars Shiv Kumari w/o Bhim Singh, Indira Kumari, Bhuvnesh Kumari alongwith Bhim Singh in A/c No. 77, but they have not been impleaded as defendants. The possession of the plaintiff was also denied. The defendant No.1 had even denied that the defendant No.2 was ever private secretary of his father. It was the defendants case that the suit land could only be allotted to lower & middle class of society therefore, could not have been sold, nor oral sale agreement could have been entered into with the plaintiff because such an agreement was ab-initio void being against public policy in the eye of law and not enforceable, inasmuch as, no rights could accrue to the plaintiff, on suc
1. Pradesh Cooperative Federation vs. Sunder Bros. Delhi (AIR 1967 SC 249)
3. Printers (Mysore) (P) Ltd. vs. Pothan Joseph (1960 (3) SCR 713 = AIR 1960 SC 1156)
7. Abdul Khader Rowther vs. PK Sarai Bai (AIR 1990 SC 682)
8. Radhakishan vs. Sridhar (AIR 1960 SC 1368)
9. Satyabrata vs. Mugneeram (AIR 1954 SC 44)
4. NR Dangre vs. Whirlpool Corpn. (1996 (5) SCC 714)
5. O. Verghese vs. Joseph Aley (1969 (2) SCC 539)
6. Prem Raj vs. DLF Housing Construction (P) Ltd. (1968 (3) SCR 648)
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