Honble SINGH, CJ.–Since, the point involved in the matter is short one, we proceed to dispose of the same with the consent of the parties today itself.

(2). The appellant was enroled in the Army on 13.11.1967. At the time of his enrolment he was placed in medical category A. While in service he fell ill. As a consequence of his illness, he was boarded out of the Army on 19.10.1968 with medical category E. The Medical Board, which was convened before the appellant was boarded out of service, assessed his disability at 100%.

(3). After being boarded out, the appellant filed a representation to the concerned authority for grant of disability pension. The representation however, was rejected.

(4). The appellant being aggrieved by the rejection of his demand for disability pension, filed a writ petition before this Court.

(5). The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 27.11.2002 allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents to grant the benefit of disability pension to the appellant w.e.f. 22.10.1998, the date of filing of the writ petition.

(6). The appellant being aggrieved by the fact that the learned Single Judge, allowed the disability pension w.e.f. the date of filing of the writ petition and not from the date he was boarded out from service, filed the instant appeal.

(7). We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

(8). We are of the view, that the appellant ought to have been granted disability pension from the date, he was boarded out from service i.e. from 20.10.1968.

(9). Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant is not entitled to the grant of disability pension w.e.f. 20.10.1968 in as much as there was delay in filing the writ petition. At the most, he can be paid disability pension from the date of filing of the writ petition. Learned counsel will like us to restrict the payment of disability pension by application of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit.

(10). We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents. We do not find any substance in them. The denial of disability pension to he appellant for years together was a continuous wrong. It was negation and breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was the duty of the respondents to have paid the disability pension to the appellant w.e.f. 20.10.1968. For the said view, we draw support from the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Mastan Bee vs. The General Manager, South Central Railway & Anr. (1), wherein it has been held as under:-

``The very denial of her right to family pension as held by the learned Single Judge as well as the division bench is an erroneous decision on the part of the railway and in fact amounting to a violation o the guarantee assured to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution. The factum of the appellants lack of resources to approach the legal forum timely is not disputed by the railways. Question then arises on facts and circumstances of this case, the appellate bench was justified in restricting the past arrears of pension to a period much subsequent to the death of appellants husband on which date she had legally become entitled to the grant of pension? In this case as noticed by us herein above, the learned Single Judge had rejected the contention of delay put forth by the railways and taking note of the appellants right to pension and the denial of the same by the railways illegally considered it appropriate to grant the pension with retrospective effect from the date on which it became due to her. The division bench also while agreeing with the learned single judge observed that the delay in approaching the railways by the appellant for the grant of family pension was not fatal inspite of the same it restricted the payment of family pension was not fatal inspite of the same it restricted the payment of family pension from a date on which the appellant issued a local notice to the railways i.e. on 1.4.1992. We think on the facts

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