Supreme Court
Honble R.C. LAHOTI & P. VENKATARAMMA REDDI, JJ.
Shamim Ara - Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. - Respondents
Criminal Appeal No.465 of 1996
Decided On : October 01, 2002
There is no proof of talaq having taken place on 11.7.1987. What the High Court has upheld as talaq is the plea taken in the written statement and its communication to the wife by delivering a copy of the written statement on 5.12.1990. We are very clear in our mind that a mere plea taken in the written statement of a divorce having been pronounced sometime in the past cannot by itself be treated as effectuating talaq on the date of delivery of the copy of the written statement to the wife. The respondent No. 2 ought to have adduced evidence `and proved the pronouncement of talaq on 1 1. 7.1987 and if he failed in proving the plea raised in the written statement, the plea ought to have been treated as failed. We do not agree with the view propounded in the decided cases referred to by Mulla and Dr. Tahir Mahmood in their respective commentaries, wherein a mere plea of previous talaq taken in the written statement, though unsubstantiated, has been accepted as proof of talaq bringing to an end the marital relationship with effect from the date of filing of the written statement. A plea of previous divorce taken ;in the written statement cannot at all be treated as pronouncement of talaq by the husband on wife on the date of filing of the written statement in the Court followed by delivery of a copy thereof to the wife. So also the affidavit dated 31.8.1988, filed in some previous judicial proceedings not inter parte, containing a self-serving statement of respondent No.2, could not have been read in evidence as relevant and of any value. (Para 16)
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. Neither the marriage between the parties stands dissolved on 5.12.1990 nor does the liability of the respondent No.2 to pay maintenance comes to an end on that day. The respondent No.2 shall continue to remain liable for payment of maintenance until the obligation comes to an end in accordance with law. (Para 17)
(2). The respondent No.2 in his reply (written statement) dated 5.12.1990, to the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C., denied all the averments made in the application. One of the pleas taken by way of additional pleas is that he had divorced the appellant on 11.7.1987 and since then the parties had ceased to be spouses. He also claimed protection behind the Muslim Women (Protection, of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and submitted that the respondent No.2 had purchased a house and delivered the same to the appellant in lieu of Mehar (Dower), and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to any maintenance. No particulars of divorce were pleaded excepting making a bald statement as already stated hereinabove.
(3). The appellant emphatically denied having been divorced at any time. The respondent No. 2, when he appeared in the witness- box, stated having divorced the appellant on 11.7.1987 at 11 a.m. in the presence of Mehboob and other 4-5 persons of the neighbourhood. He further stated that since 1988 he had not paid anything either to the appellant or to any of the four sons for their maintenance. The divorce said to have been given by him to the appellant was a triple talaq though such a fact was not stated in the written statement.
(4). The Family Court in its order dated 3.4.1993 dealt with and upheld a strange story of divorce totally beyond the case set up by the respondent No.2. The learned Presiding Judge referred to some affidavit dated 31.8.1988 said to have been filed by the respondent No.2 in some civil suit details whereof are not available from the record of the present case but certainly to which litigation the appellant was not a party, In that affidavit it was stated by the respondent No. 2 that he had divorced the appellant 15 months before. The learned Judge held that from such affidavit the plea of the respondent No. 2 found corroboration of his having divorced the appellant. The learned Judge concluded that the appellant was not entitled to any maintenance in view of her having been divorced.
(5). The appellant preferred a revision before the High Court. The High Court held that the divorce which is alleged to have been given by the respondent no.2 to the appellant was not given in the presence of the appellant and it is not the case of the respondent that the same was communicated to her But the communication would stand completed on 5. 12.1990 with the filing of the written statement by the respondent no. 2 in the present case. Therefore, the High Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to claim maintenance from 1.1.1988 to 5.12.1990 (the later date being the one on which reply to application uSec.125 Cr.P.C. was filed by the respondent No.2 in the Court) whereafter her entitlement to have maintenance from respondent No.2 shall case. The figure of maintenance was appointed by the High Court at Rs. 200/-.
(6). The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave. The singular issue arising for decision is whether the appellant can be said to have been divorced and the said divorce communicated to the appellant so as to become effective from 5.12.1990, the date of fi
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