Honble PASAYAT, J.–Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court holding that the appellant was not entitled to any compensation under the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923 (in short the Act). The appeal filed by the respondents under Section 30 of the Act was allowed by the High Court. The Commissioner for Workmens Compensation (in short Commissioner) had awarded a sum of Rs. 61,236/- by award dated 16.6.2001, which was challenged by the respondents before the High Court.

(2). Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Mr. J. Venkaiah, the appellants husband (hereinafter referred to as the deceased workman), was working in Nellore Thermal Station, Nellore. On 24.9.1994 he died at the work spot. Appellant filed an application before the Commissioner claiming compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Her stand in th claim petition was that the death was due to stress and strain closely linked with the employment of the deceased workman and, therefore, attributable to an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The plea found favour with the Commissioner who made the award as noted above. The rspondents filed an appeal under Section 30 of the Act before the High Court. The primary stand was that the deceased workman did die on account of any injury sustained by him "in any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment". The High Court noted that there was no injury as such, but he died due to heart attack at the work spot. The High Court found that the nature of the job which the deceased workman was doing could not have caused any stress and strain and, therefore, the death due to heart attack cannot be said to have been caused by any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

(3). In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that whenever a person dies as a result of heart attack at the work spot, it can be said that he died due to the stress and strain of the working conditions. He, therefore, pleaded that the order of the Commissioner should be restored and that of the High Court be set aside, as the Commissioner had indicated reasons in support of his conclusions.

(4). There is no appearance on behalf of the respondents.

(5). Section 3(1) of the Act which is relevant for the purpose of this case reads as follows:

"3. Employers Liability for Compensation.–(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter :

Provided that the employer shall not be so liable–(a) in respect of any injury which does not result in the total or partial disablement of the workman for a period exceeding three days:

(b) in respect of any injury, not resulting in death or permanent total disablement, caused by an accident which is directly attributable to–(i) the workman having been at the time thereof under the influence of drink or drugs, or

(ii) the willful disobedience of the workman to an order expressly given, or to a rule expressly framed, for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen, or

(iii) the willful removal or disregard by the workman of any safety guard or other device which he knew to have been provided for the purpose of securing the safety of workmen."

(6). Under Section 3(1) it has to be established that there was some causal connection between the death of the workman and his employment. If the workman dies as natural result of the disease which he was suffering or while suffering from a particular disease he dies of that disease as a result of wear and tear, of the employment no liability would be fixed upon the employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated the death, or if the death was due not only to the disease but also the disease coupled with the employment, then it can be said that the death arose out of the em

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