(2). Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the application filed in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C.). Appellant had filed a petition for quashing the complaint filed by the respondent in terms of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the `Act) In the complaint it was averred that a cheque was issued by the appellant on 31.3.1998 which was dishonoured by the bank when presented on 11.4.1998. Notice dated 27.4.1998 was duly served on the appellant. Since the accused appellant assured that the cheque will be honoured if it is presented again, the cheque was presented but was again dishonoured on 30.9.1998 for which notice dated 13.10.1998 was again served on the appellant. But no payment was made. Appellant filed an application in terms of Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C.) before the trial court for discharge. It was averred that the application was clearly barred by time and therefore the said application ought to be dismissed at the outset. The motion was opposed by the respondent. The learned Judicial Magistrate dismissed the application stating that in view of the judgment in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Others [2004 (7) SCC 338], the trial court cannot review or reconsider the order issuing process; once process has been issued pursuant to an order passed in a complaint case. Appellant filed a petition in terms of Section 482 Cr.P.C. which as noticed above was dismissed. It is to be noted that the only stand of the appellant before the High Court was that even if the position as stated by the respondent is accepted to be correct, in view of Section 142 B of the Act, a complaint was not to be entertained. High Court dismissed the application on the ground that proviso of Section 142 (b) of the Act was inserted vide Act 55 of 2002 which empowered the court to extend the period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown. Therefore, the petition was to be dismissed.

(3). In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the amendment inserted by Act 55 of 2002 had no application to the facts of the case as the various events took place much prior to 2002 and in fact the complaint was filed on 28.11.1998. It was further pointed out that the case of respondent was not that case in hand was covered by the amendment. There is no such plea taken. The High Court could not have made out a new case.

(4). There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent.

(5). For resolution of the controversy Sections 138 and 142 of the Act are relevant. They read as follows:

"Section 138: Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless -

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writin