Honble JAIN, J.–Leave granted.

(2). The sole appellant stands convicted under Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short `IPC) for the offence of driving on public way so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life and also under Section 304A, IPC for causing death by rash or negligent act, not amounting to culpable homicide. The Trial Court sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs.5000/- for both the offences and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. On appeal to the High Court, vide its judgment dated 10th November, 2006 in Criminal Revision Petition No.159 of 2005, the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore has maintained the conviction but has reduced the sentence to simple imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.5000/- for the offence under Section 279, IPC and simple imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.5000/- for offence under Section 304A, IPC. This judgment of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal by special leave.

(3). Since learned senior counsel for the appellant has not seriously questioned the correctness of the conviction and has confined his arguments to the quantum of sentence, we deem it unnecessary to refer to the accusations against the appellant in greater detail. It would suffice to note that the appellant was charge- sheeted for driving a tanker in a rash and negligent manner so as to endanger human life and in the process dashing against a Kinetic Honda scooter, being driven by the deceased, who fell down and was run over by the left wheel of the tanker. The deceased succumbed to the injuries on way to the hospital. As noted above, on appraisal of the evidence, both the courts below have found the appellant guilty of the offence under Sections 279 and 304A, IPC.

(4). Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that having regard to the fact that the mother of the victim has filed an affidavit, inter alia, stating that she does not have any grievance against the appellant as she believes that it was an act of God and it was their destiny that their son left them at an early age, the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant may be set aside. Learned senior counsel also pleaded that the appellant was prepared to pay reasonable amount of compensation, which may be determined by this Court to the mother of the victim. In support, learned senior counsel drew our attention to the affidavit filed by the mother of the deceased, on issuance of notice to her. Para 6 of the affidavit, on which emphasis was laid by the learned counsel, reads thus:

"I state that being the mother and class I heir of the victim, late Shri Vasant Prabhu, I am competent and willing to compound the offence against Shri Manish Jalan. I state that I have no objection whatsoever if this Honble Court wishes to set aside the conviction and sentence against Shri Manish Jalan. For this purpose, I am ready and willing to receive such additional compensation which this Honble Court may feel appropriate, just and reasonable."

(5). Having carefully glanced through the evidence on record and the reasoning of the courts below, we do not find any ground to interfere with the conviction of the appellant under the afore- mentioned provisions. Hence, we reject the challenge of the appellant made in this appeal to his conviction.

(6). On the question of compounding of the offences, as prayed for in the affidavit, Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short `Cr.P.C.) dealing with "compounding of offences", provides that only such offences as are included in the two tables, provided thereunder can be compounded. Sub- section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. imposes a specific bar on compounding of other offences, not included in the two tables. Admittedly, offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A, IPC do not figure in the said tables and are, therefore, not compoundable. Conscious of the legal position, learned c

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