An order passed by the Controller under the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, subject to appeal or revision, is final and cannot be challenged in any court of law. Subsequent events, after the order becomes final, cannot be considered to render the order unexecutable.

T. R. Handa, J.—The petitioner Shri B. N. Pandey was a tenant under the respondent landlady Smt. Indira Chohan in respect of a residential set located within the municipal limits of Simla. The respondent landlady brought an action for enjectment of the petitioner from the said premises in the Court of Rent Controller Simla under Section 14 of the H. P. Urban Rent Control Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act’. The main ground on which the ejectment of the petitioner was claimed was that the respondent landlady require the premises in question bonafide for her own residential use. The petitioner who initially contested the claim of the landlady, later conceded before the Controller that in respondent landlady required the premises in question for her bona fide use. A compromise order for ejectment of the petitioner was, therefore, pissed by the Controller This order was passed on 25-9-1979. As mutually agreed between the parties, the Controller, however, allowed the petitioner time upto 30-9-1980 to vacate the premises. In other words the ejectment order was made executable only after 30-9-1980.

2. In spite of the compromise ejectment order suffered against him, the petitioner refused to vacate the premises. He in turn, a few days before the expiry of the period allowed to him to vacate the promises, instituted a civil suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge Simla praying for issue of (i) a declaration that the compromise ejectment order dated 25-9-1979 passed by the Controller again t him had become unexcitable on account of certain developments which had come into existenance after the passing of that order and (ii) a perpetual injunction restraining the respondent from seeking execution of the aforesaid ejectment order. It was pleaded in the suit that the bonafide requirement of the respondent landlady which existed at the time when the impugned ejectment order was passed and which was the only ground on which that order was passed, existed no more. It was alleged that after the date of the said ejectment order, the respondent landlady as also her husband had acquired vacant possession of sufficient residential accommodation at Simla to meet their requirements and hence the order of ejectment had become un executable as the purpose which it was required to serve had already been served.

3. Along with the suit the petitioner moved an application under Order XXXIX rule 1 and 2 C. P. C. in the trial Court praying for issue of an interim injunction restraining the respondent from seeking execution of the ejectment order during the pendency of the suit. The trial Court allowed that application and issued a temporary injunction of the nature prayed for. On appeal the District Judge reversed the order of trial Court and vacated the ad interim injunction granted by the trial Court vide his order dated 21-8-1971. The petitioner thereupon approached this Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking revision of the order of the District Judge,

4. This revision petition was in the first instance listed for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court. A question appears to have been raised before the learned single Judge whether a civil suit of the kind filed by the present petitioner was at all maintainable in law. The learned single Judge being of the view that this question was of considerable importance and needed authoritative pronouncement by a larger Bench made a reference for constituting a larger Bench. The reference is in the following terms : "The main question which arises for determination in this case is whether a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit of a tenant on the basis of the subsequent events, after the tenant has agreed to vacate the premises in terms of the agreement. No. specific authority has been cited before me to show that the suit is barred. This being an important question of law, it is desirable that the same be decided by a larger Bench. As such, the paper