The requirements of natural justice are not cast in a strait-jacket formula and their applicability varies from case to case, depending on the circumstances, nature of the inquiry, rules under which the Tribunal is acting, and the subject matter being dealt with.

P. D. Desai, C. J — The petitioner is the occupant of premises described as Set No. 37/1-4, Nabha Estate, Simla (hereinafter referred to as "the premises"). It is not in dispute that Nablia Estate was the property of the erstwhile State of Nabha and that after the merger of the Nabha State with the Union of India it vested in the ernt while Pepsu State and that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant by the erstwhile Pepsu State. The property then passed hands and was vested successively in the Punjab State, the Union Territory and ultimately in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The petitioner admittedly continued as a tenant of the premises till March 31, 1964, The last agreement of lease executed between the Governor of Punjab and the petitioner for a period of one year commencing from April 1, 1963 and ending with March 31, 1964 is on the record. Under the said lease, the rent was payable at the rate of Rs 18,73 per month inclusive of water tax and excess water charges. Two of the conditions of the lease were that the lessee shall restore to the lessor the possession of the property, on the expiry or the sooner termination of the lease, in the state in which he received it (ordinary wear and tear in use excepted) and that the premises shall not be used for business purposes save with the special permission of the lessor. There is no agreement of lease for the subsequent period(s), none at least has been placed on the record of the case. However, it is not in dispute that the petitioner has continued to occupy the premises thereafter and that till February 1972, the occupation charges at the same rate were continued to be paid by him and accepted by the Estate Officer, HP PWD. Simla (third respondent).

2. A notice dated May 5, 1972, Annexure PB-1, purporting to have been issued under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act 2971) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), was served upon the petitioner by registered post by the then Estate. Officer (Shri P. N. Nehru), stating that he had been continuing to occupy the premises even after the tenancy had expired long ago and that he was holding over without the authority of law and that, therefore, his possession was unauthorised and calling upon him to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. The petitioner showed cause vide his reply dated May 19, 1973, Annexure PB-2 given through Counsel. In para 1 of the said reply, the petitioner contended in substance that the Estate Officer was also the Collector under the provisions of the Act and that the discharge of the functions of Collector on his pan was illegal, arbitrary and against natural justice and the rule of law. The precise objection was taken in the following words:— "The Estate Officer is the Manager and the custodian of the Nabha Estate and the premises in question is a part of the said Estate. His own conduct and his official record is a subject-matter of evidence in the eviction proceedings as being initiated and being tried by his ownself. As such the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to sit as a judge for his own conduct in his capacity as a Collector under the said Act." Several other contentions were also put forward, such as, that the proceedings were barred by res-judicata, estoppel, acquiescence and limitation, that the original lease had culminated into a perpetual or irrevocable lease by the implied conduct of the parties, that the occupation of the premises in accordance with the terms of such subsisting lease was lawful etc.

3. In the course of the eviction proceedings, which commenced before the Collector (Shri P. N. Nehru), the petitioner was represented by Counsel. The issues were framed on July 4, 1972. The case was then adjourned to August 5, 1972, for recording the evidence on behalf of the Department. Instead of recording the evidence on the said day, the Collector adjourned the case sine-die, since the request of