The main legal point established is that the material date for invoking jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is crucial in determining the limitation for filing a petition.

C.K. Thakker, C.J.—Admitted Mr. K.L Bali, learned Counsel appears and waives service of notice of admission on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. Sanjay Karol, learned Advocate General appears and waives service of notice of admission on behalf of respondent No. 2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the matter is taken up for final hearing today.

2. This petition is directed against an order passed by the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal on 3rd April. 2000 in O.A. No. 853 of 1990.

3. The petitioner was the applicant before the Tribunal. He preferred a petition challenging his termination from service, as ordered by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Shimla on 18th November, 1983 with effect from 1st November, 1983, which was confirmed by the State Government on 12th January, 1990. He approached the Tribunal by filing Original Application No. 853 of 1990 on 7th August, 1990. When the notices were issued to the respondents, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents, inter alia, contending that the petition filed by the petitioner was beyond the period of limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

4. The Tribunal upheld the contention observing that the order of termination of service was passed by the 1st respondent-Commissioner on 18th November, 1983 and the services of the petitioner stood terminated with effect from 1st November, 1983. As the action was taken in November, 1983 and the petition was filed in August, 1990, it was instituted after a period of three years and hence it was barred by Section 21 of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the petition on the ground of limitation without entering into the merits of the matter. The said decision has been challenged by the petitioner in the present petition.

5. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is an error of law as well as of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal in not entertaining the petition and dismissing it on the ground of limitation. It was submitted that though the order was passed on 18th November, 1983 by the 1st respondent, being aggrieved by the said order, a representation was made by the petitioner. The petitioner also reported for duty on 11th February, 1985, but he was not allowed to join. When he made representation, his case was recommended by the 1st respondent vide his letter dated 28th June, 1989. The second respondent, however, did not think it fit to grant the prayer made by the petitioner and finally, the representation came to be rejected in January, 1990. In these circumstances, the petitioner was obliged to approach the Tribunal and in August, 1990, he filed the Original Application. By no stretch of imagination, therefore, it can be said that the petition was beyond the period of limitation under Section 21 of the Act. He, therefore, submitted that the order deserves to be quashed and set aside by directing the Tribunal to decide the same afresh in accordance with law.

6. Mr. K.L. Bali, learned Counsel, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Tribunal and contended that the action was taken on 18th November, 1983. Even thereafter the public notice was issued by the Commissioner on 29th September, 1983, wherein it was stated that the petitioner should report for duty within a period of thirty days. But the petitioner did not report. The action was, therefore, taken on 18th November, 1983 and the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 1st November, 1983. According to the learned Counsel, therefore, the relevant date would be 18th November, 1983 and since no action was taken for a number of years, the Tribunal was right in holding that the petition was barred by limitation.

7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the petition deserves to be allowed. It is true that an order was passed by the 1st respondent on 18th November, 1983 and t