JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J. - This judgment shall dispose of two appeals being FAO No. 222 of 1993 and FAO No. 279 of 1993. The only question to be decided in these cases is with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil Court.

2. Facts giving rise to the present appeals are that in both the suits, the plaintiff filed suit for declaration that the verbal orders of termination of service of the plaintiff and illegal and nullity and not binding on the plaintiff with the effect that, the plaintiff continues in service with all antecedents service benefits till the date of superannuation or till he is lawfully removed from service. There was also a prayer for mandatory injunction.

3. Both the suits were decreed, by the trial Court by holding that the termination of the service of the defendant is wrong and illegal and the plaintiff continues to be in service as before, entitling the plaintiff to all service benefits including the wages of the period he was not allowed to work.

4. The present respondents filed appeals in the court of learned District Judge, Sirmour at Nahan. The learned District Judge has held that the civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter since the matter was squarely covered under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act and the remedy of the plaintiffs, if any, lay with the State Administrative Tribunal.

5. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant, has urged that the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court is totally illegal. According to him the order of termination had been passed without giving any opportunity to the applicants and, therefore, the said order being violative of the principles of natural justice was null and void and according to him in case of such an order, civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.

6. Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Additional Advocate General, has contended that no verbal orders were passed and in fact the case set up in defence was that the present appellant had left the job of his own violation and his services had never been terminated. The plaintiff did not come for work for more than one year and as such there is no order of termination.

7. In support of his contention Mr. Kuldip Singh he relied upon Lala Shri Bhagwan and another v. Ram Chand and another, AIR 1965 SC 1767; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, 1981(1) SCC 664; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayaki and another, 1988(2) SCC 602; M/s. R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fathechand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) and another, 1989(1) SCC 628 and Krishan Lai v. State of J&K, 1994(4) SCC 422. He contends that all these judgments lay down that rules of natural justice are sacrosanct and any order passed in violation of the rules of natural justice is void, ab initio. He placed reliance on Dhruv Green Field Ltd. v. Hukam Singh and others, 2002(6) SCC 416 to contend that if an order is void ab initio then the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be deemed to be barred. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that every order whether judicial, quasi judicial or administrative which effects the rights of any party should be a speaking order and should be passed in accordance with the rules of natural justice.

8. The point raised by Mr. Kuldip Singh is that when an order is passed in violation of the rules of natural justice such an order is void and then the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit challenging such an order. I have great doubt with regard to the second part of the proposition propounded by the learned Counsel for the applicant. However, I need not go into such question in the present case since in my view this question does not arise for decision.

9. The suit in the present case(s) were filed not only for setting aside the verbal order of termination, but also with the prayer that the plaintiff shall continue in service with all antecedent benefits. It is not

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