The presumption under Section 69 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, that forest produce belongs to the Government, applies in this case as the petitioner failed to prove that the Katha was not extracted from illicitly felled trees.

This Revision Petition, under S.397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), arises out of the order passed on 17-2-1989 by Sessions Judge Kangra Division, in Criminal appeal No. 13 of 1988, thereby dismissing the appeal of the petitioner filed under S.454 of the Code and thereby confirming the order of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Palampur, dated 23-7-1988 in Criminal Case No. 85-III/1986 whereby the case property was directed to be confiscated while acquitting the petitioner-accused. The petitioner has a grievance against this order and, therefore, he assails the same by way of this petition.

2. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was prosecuted for an offence under S.33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He was accused of felling 15 Khair trees unauthorisedly from private area of Tika Kholi, Tika Sai and Gadiara. He was also accused of having uprooted stumps of 11 trees, which were marked to him, in violation of the Rules. The trying Magistrate by his judgement concluded that illicit felling of trees had taken place but the same having taken place prior to 28-3-1985, the challan having been filed in the Court on 13-3-1986, therefore, cognizance of the offence could not be taken in view of the limitation imposed under S. 468 of the Code. The trying Magistrate observed that the prosecution had not been able to prove the damage reports or to show that these reports were signed by the accused. The accused was, therefore, acquitted of the charge. While doing so, order of confiscation and forfeiture of the Katha, which was taken into possession by the police, was passed. The Court said that the order of confiscation and forfeiture of the Katha in favour of the State was being passed as it has not been proved on behalf of the defence that the case property pertains to the trees which had been marked for the accused.

3. The appellate Court held that the accused had been acquitted for the reasons that the Magistrate found himself incompetent to take cognizance of the offence for want of limitation under S.468 of the Code. It further observed that the accused in his statement under S. 313 of the Code merely stated that he had cut only those trees which were duly marked for him. Referring to damage reports, the court held that the accused had filed an application agreeing to pay compensation in respect of the timber illicitly felled by him. Therefore, evidence on record was there to indicate that the trees were illicitly felled and thereafter seized by the Forest Department and it cannot be said that no offence in respect of Katha seized by the Forest Department was committed. The appellate court found no reason to disturb the order of the trying Magistrate, and dismissed the appeal of the petitioner.

4. Shri Devinder Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, has very seriously contended that the judgement under appeal deserves to be set aside as the same cannot be sustained in the eye of law. Elaborating his submission, he urges that the trial Court did not hold any inquiry while passing the order under S.452 of the Code relating to the disposal of the case property on the conclusion of the trial. I am not impressed by this submission of Shri Devinder Gupta. In my opinion, order under S.452 of the Code is passed on the termination of the inquiry, trial or proceedings before a Court. It is passed consequent to the decision of the main case. For passing an order relating to the disposal of the case property, there is no need to examine witnesses and to hold an elaborate inquiry. For arriving at a decision, the Court looks at and examines the facts and the evidence already before it in the main case. Similar views were expressed in, 1979 Cri LJ 428 (Mad), (Govindachari v. The State).

5. Shri Devinder Gupta further contended that the trial Court having acquitted the petitioner, it was but natural that the case property seized from the petitioner is ret