An order framing a charge against the accused for a particular offence is not an interlocutory order and is, therefore, revisable under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C.

T. U. Mehta, C. J.:- The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, simla has framed charge against both the petitioners for the offence under S. 454, and the same Section read with S. 109, I. P. C. The respondent No. 1 Shri Stanley Haque, who is officiating Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Bishop Cotton School, filed a private complaint against the present petitioners and one other for the offences under Sections 454 and 448 I.P.C. On this complaint, the learned Magistrate issued summons under S. 448 I. P. C. Thereafter, evidence offered by the complainant was recorded and ultimately after hearing the learned Advocates of the parties the learned Magistrate has framed charge against these two petitioners, as stated above, on 1st March 1975 and discharged the original accused No. 2.

2. Being aggrieved by this order of the learned Magistrate, the present petitioners, against whom the charge has been framed, have approached this Court in this revision.

3. It appears that on 5-9-1975 this matter came up before a learned single judge of this Court, and at the time of hearing before him a preliminary objection was raised to the effect that the order of the learned Magistrate framing charge against the petitioners being an interlocutory order no revision application was permissible under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 397 of the Cr. P. C. The learned single Judge, finding that there was a decision of this Court given by a learned single Judge on this question which requires to be reconsidered, has referred this matter to the Division Bench. This is how this matter comes before this Bench.

4. Shri Bakshi, who appears on behalf of the respondent, has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that this application is not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 397 of the Cri. P. C., 1973, which states that the powers of revision conferred by sub-sec. (1) of S. 397 shall not be exercised in relation to an interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry or other proceeding. According to Shri Bakshi, the order of the Magistrate to frame the charge, as stated above, being an interlocutory order, this matter does not lie under S. 397 of the Code.

5. The petitioners have also invoked the provisions of S. 482 of the Cri. P. C. 1973, which saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order (under) the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, With regard to this contention of the petitioners, Shri Bakshi contended that inherent powers of the High Court, contemplated by S. 482 of the Code, cannot be invoked in view of the specific bar contained in S. 397 (2) of the Code.

6. Before going into the merits of the matter, we shall first dispose of the question whether an order to frame charge passed by a Judicial Magistrate can be construed as an interlocutory order, and can, therefore, be held to have been barred by sub-sec. (2) of Section 397 of the Code. We find that or this question there are two specific decisions given by the Supreme Court. The first decision is found in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185 : (1977 Cri LJ 1891) wherein the expression "interlocutory order", as found in S. 397 (2) of the Code, has been interpreted. The Supreme Court has observed in that case that this expression merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties, and therefore, any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court. The Supreme Court has further observed in this decision that orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial court cannot be said to be interlocutory orders so a