An appeal lies under sub-s. (1) of S.19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against an order or decision of a High Court concluding the contempt proceeding, and not against an order declining to discharge the notice issued by the Court to the alleged contemner in a contempt proceeding.

R. S. Pathak, C. J.:- This appeal under S.19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is directed against an order of our brother Chet Ram Thakur J. declining to discharge the notice issued by him on a motion made by the respondents for initiating contempt proceedings against the appellants.

2. The State Bank of Patiala filed a suit against the respondents for recovery of Rs.20,32,004.57 p. The plaintiff made an application under O.38, R.5 and O.39, R.1 read with S.151 of the Civil P.C. On Jan. 14, 1976 our learned brother Chet Ram Thakur J. granted an interim injunction restraining the defendants from disposing of the property during the pendency of the suit and also directed them to furnish adequate security in order to satisfy such decree as may ultimately be passed. He directed notice to issue to the defendants to show cause why the interim injunction be not confirmed and why they should not furnish security. It appears that in purported compliance with his order warrants of attachment of property belonging to the defendants were issued and attachment was effected. Subsequently, on the matter coming to the notice of our learned brother and the error being discovered, he quashed the warrants of attachment and directed the release of the property from attachment. Property which had already been hypothecated with the Bank remained subject to hypothecation.

3. The present respondents then moved this Court for the institution of contempt proceedings against the appellants on the ground that although no order to that effect had been made by this Court they had secured the issue of the warrants of attachment and had thus committed an abuse of the process of this Court and were guilty of fraud practiced on the Court. The motion came on before our learned brother, and he directed issue of notice to the appellants. The appellants then applied for the discharge of that notice. Our learned brother, by his order dated Aug. 6, 1976, has declined to discharge the notice observing that there was no reason to do so on the facts as they stood before him and that "it would be at a subsequent stage when they (the appellants) succeed in making out that they had not in any way misrepresented the facts and had bona fide got the orders issued nor had they in any way persuaded the Registry to issue these orders on misrepresentation of facts so as to flout the authority of the Court", that he would consider what order to make in the matter. Against that order, the appellants have brought the present appeal.

4. At the outset, the question is whether the appeal is maintainable. The appeal was filed under sub-s. (1) of S.19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Section 19 provides: "19. Appeals:- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court; Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that- (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended; (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. The point for consideration is whether the order or decision of our learned brother can be described as an order of decision made in the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction to punish for contempt within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of S.19. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the language of sub-s. (1) of S.19 is of the widest amplitude, and that when the statute declares that an appeal lies from any order or decision it necessarily implies that every order or decision made by the cour