Procedural laws should advance the cause of justice and not leave the court helpless in meeting extraordinary situations.

Sanjay Karol, J.-Plaintiff has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 2.9.2008 passed by the Addl. District Judge (Fast Track Court), Solan, H.P., wherein the plaintiff’s application for amendment of the aplication filed in Civil Suit No.10FTC/1 of 2007/08 titled as Ashok Chopra v. Neelam Rana, stands dismissed.

2. The plaintiff filed an application dated 25.11.2007 under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC, seeking amendment of the replication. The defendant/respondent herein opposed the same, inter alia, on the ground that the aplication did not form part of the pleadings, hence, the Court had no authority to pass orders allowing the application.

3. The trial Court dismissed the application on the ground of maintainability for the reason that neither had the plaintiff filed any written application seeking permission nor was any permission granted by the Court permitting him to file the replication. Hence, the replication not being part of the pleadings could not be amended.

4. While holding so, the Court referred to and relied upon the view taken by various High Courts in the following decisions:-

5. Bhagat Ram & Ors. vs. Bachana & Ors. 2008(2) Civil Court Cases 620 (H.P), M/s. Anant Construction (P) Ltd. v. Ram Niwas 1995(1) Civil Court Cases 348 (Delhi), B. Rajamani vs. Mrs. Azhar Sultana & ors. 2005(2) Civil Court Cases 696 (A.P.), Mohd. Shafi Bakshi vs. Krishna Bansal 1993(2) Rent Control Reporter 527, Swaran Kaur vs. Harjit Singh 2000(2) C.C.C. 477 (P&H).

6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. In my view, findings of the Court below are not only perverse but contrary to record.

7. The provisions of Order 8 Rule 9 CPC does not stipulate filing of any written application seeking leave of the Court to file subsequent pleadings. The power of the Court is not circumscribed by any written application and such power to grant leave can either be suo motu or even on an oral prayer of either of the parties to the lis.

8. The Apex Court in Kailash vs. Nanhku & Ors. 2005(4) SCC 480 has held as under:-

“All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar (1975) 1 SCC 774, are pertinent:-

"The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judges conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer.

The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. …….Justice is the goal of jurisprudence __ processual, as much as substantive.”

9. In State of Punjab and Anr. v. Shamlal Murari and Anr. (1976) 1 SCC 719, the Court approved in no unmistakable terms the approach of moderating into wholesome directions what is regarded as mandatory on the principle that "Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice."

In Ghanshyam Dass and Ors. v. Dominion of India and Ors. (1984) 3 SCC 46, the Court r