Deepak Gupta, J.

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 16.2.2010 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, (Fast Track Court), Shimla, whereby he dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as respondent No.2) and confirmed the interim order passed by the learned Trial Court restraining the petitioner from raising construction on the suit land.

2. At the outset, I may deal with the preliminary submission raised by Mr. J.L. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the respondent who has strenuously canvassed that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with such orders. In this regard, Mr. Bhardwaj has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sadhana Lodh Vs. National Insurance Company Co. Ltd. and another, (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 524 wherein the Apex Court held that mere wrong decision given by an inferior tribunal is not sufficient reason to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in respect of supervisory jurisdiction, the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction can only see whether the inferior tribunal has acted within the parameters and is not expected to correct the decision or re-appreciate the case.

3. In fact, the Apex Court in Shalini Shyam Shety and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 329 has dealt in detail with the scope of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court and laid down the following principles for the exercise of such jurisdiction:-

“49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of HighCourt's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:

(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

(c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”.

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic