T Ramabhadran, CJ

[1] The main point for determination in this reference is, whether an order directing an accused person to furnish his finger impressions for the purpose of comparison with certain disputed similar impressions under Section 73 of the Evidence Act or otherwise, would be contrary to the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. For reasons to be stated shortly, I have come to the conclusion that the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not be infringed in such a case.

[2] Under Article 20(3), no person, accused of any offence, shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. We have, therefore, to see whether by calling upon the petitioner Bhupendra Nath, to give his finger impressions, the trial Magistrate has compelled him i.e., the petitioner to be a witness against himself.

[3] When arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard at Bilaspur on the 24th ultimo, learned counsel for the petitioner contended, vehemently, that the order of the Magistrate, directing the taking of the petitioner's finger impressions, was nothing short of compelling him to be a witness against himself. Reliance was placed upon the following authorities:--

(a) M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300, wherein their Lordships observed as follows:

"Article 20(3) embodies the principle of protection against compulsion of self-incrimination which is one of the fundamental canons of the British system of criminal jurisprudence and which has been adopted by the American system and incorporated as an article of its Constitution. It has also, to a substantial extent, been recognized in the Anglo-Indian Administration of criminal justice in this country by incorporation into various statutory provisions."

"So far as the Indian law is concerned, it may be taken that the protection against self-incrimination continues more or less as in the English common law, so far as the accused and production of documents are concerned, but that it has been modified as regards oral testimony of witnesses, by introducing compulsion and providing immunity from prosecution on the basis of such compelled evidence."

"Analysing the terms in which this fundamental right has been declared in our Constitution, it may be said to consist of the following components: (1) It is a right pertaining to a person 'accused of an offence'; (2) It is a protection against 'compulsion to be a witness'; and (3) It is a protection against such compulsion resulting in his giving evidence 'against himself'."

"Broadly stated, the guarantee in Article 20(3) is against 'testimonial compulsion'. But there is no reason to confine it to the oral evidence of a person standing his trial for an offence when called to the witness stand. The protection afforded to an accused in so far as it is related to the phrase 'to be a witness' is not merely in respect of testimonial compulsion in the Court room but may well extend to compelled testimony previously obtained from him. It is available, therefore, to a person against whom a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence has been levelled which, in the normal course, may result in prosecution."

"Considered in this light, the guarantee under Article 20(3) would be available to persons against whom a First Information Report has been recorded as accused therein. It would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against them."

(b) Rajamuthukoil Pillai v. Periyasami Nadar, AIR 1956 Mad 632. There, on the strength of the ruling, reported in AIR 1954 SC 300, a learned Judge of the Madras High Court held that:

"A direction by the Court asking the accused to give his thumb impression amounts to asking him to furnish evidence which is prohibited under Article 20(3). The accused, therefore, cannot be compelled to give his thumb impression as directed by the Magistrate."

(c) and (d) Bhaluka Behera v. The State, AI