ORDER :- This is an application under O. 22, R. 4, C.P.C., and it is supported by a petition under S. 5 of the Limitation Act and an affidavit. The application arises under the following circumstances. On 30-12-1952, the learned District Judge of Mandi and Chamba dismissed a suit brought by Mela Ram and others against Kanhya Lal and others. Kanhya Lal, defendant aforesaid, died on 26-1-1953, leaving two sons, Amar Nath and Jagan Nath. On 2-4-1953, an appeal was presented by Mela Ram and others against the judgment and decree of the District Judge. Since, Kanhya Lal was dead, his sons, Amar Nath and Jagan Nath, were impleaded as respondents 1 and 2 in the memorandum of appeal. At the foot of the memorandum of appeal, a note was made that since Kanhya Lal, defendant, had died on 26-1-1953, his sons (who were his legal representatives) were impleaded as respondents 1 and 2.

An office objection was raised to the impleading of Amar Nath and Jagan Nath without an application. In answer to the office objection, the appellants represented that since Kanhya Lal had died after the decision of the suit, no application was necessary. To be on the safer side, however, an application, purporting to be under O. 22, R. 4, along with another under S. 5 of the Limitation Act supported by an affidavit, was filed by the appellants on 7-5-1953. On this office reported that it was beyond time by 11 days. While admitting the appeal, my learned predecessor made it clear that the admission was subject to objection. A preliminary date was fixed for disposal of the application under O. 22, R. 4.

2. Today, I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Sri Ved Vyas filed a memorandum of appearance for Jagan Nath.

3. The point for consideration is whether in a case like this, an application under O. 22, R. 4 was necessary at all. A bare perusal of O. 22, R. 4 makes it clear that it applies only to pending proceedings, i.e. suits or appeals. If any authority is necessary reference may be made to - Venkata Narasimhan v. Konda Reddi, AIR 1951 Hyd 55 (A), where it was held that provisions of law contained in O. 22, R. 4, C.P.C., contemplate pending proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioners cited - Pitamberdas v. Bhawanilal AIR 1932 Sind 220 (B), where it was held :

"Order 22 applies to joinder of legal representatives of a person who is properly on the record, and dies pending the suit or appeal as the case may be, but not to the case where a person is dead long before suit or appeal."

In the present case, Kanhya Lal died on 26-1-1953, i.e. after the suit had been disposed of by the District Judge and before the appeal was presented to this Court. Therefore, the appellant ? impleaded the sons of Kanhya Lal as respondents 1 and 2 in the memorandum of appeal (it may be noted that it is not disputed that Amar Nath and Jagan Nath are the legal representatives of Kanhya Lal). It does not appear that a separate application was necessary to implead Amar Nath and Jagan Nath. I am supported by a ruling of the Lahore High Court, cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, and reported in - Risal Singh v. Chandgi, AIR 1939 Lah 34 (C). There, following - Ramananda v. Minachi Animal, Mad 236 (D), it was held :

"The provisions of O. 22 do not apply where a party dies after a final decree has been passed. If a plaintiff sues and dies after his suit has been dismissed, his legal representative may appeal from the decree without making any application to be brought on the record in his place."

On the same analogy, I would say that if that defendant dies after the suit has been decided his legal representatives may be impleaded in the memorandum of appeal, without a separate application to bring them on the record in place off the deceased defendant. In - 3 Mad 236 (D), referred to above, the facts were that the plaintiff died soon after the decision of his suit by the trial Court. An appeal was preferred on behalf of a minor, claiming to be his legal representative, but no a

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