1961 Supreme(HP) 10
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
C. B. CAPOOR, J.
Jai Singh
Versus
Mangtoo
Civil Misc. Petns. Nos.11 to 39 of 1961
Decided On : 27-04-1961
Hira Lal and T.P. Vaidya, for Petitioner; Hari Krishan, for Respondents.
A revenue Court is not a civil Court within the meaning of the word Court as used in Secs.14 and S.31 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940.
Headnote:
ARBITRATION - REFERENCE TO ARBITRATION - SUBJECT-MATTER WITHIN EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT - WHETHER REFERENCE VALID - WHETHER REVENUE COURT IS A CIVIL COURT - MEANING OF COURT IN ARBITRATION ACT, 1940.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a usufructuary mortgagee of certain land, referred a dispute regarding the quantum of rent payable by the respondents, tenants of the land, to arbitration. The arbitrator made an award and applied for its filing in the Court of the Assistant Collector first grade Mandi. The application was returned on the ground that the revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The petitioner then filed applications in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge Mandi for the filing of the award, which were dismissed on the ground that the subject-matter of reference was beyond the jurisdiction of a civil Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the subject-matter of reference was exclusively within the jurisdiction of a revenue Court and that a revenue Court is not a civil Court within the meaning of the word Court as used in Secs.14 and S.31 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. Therefore, the applications for the filing of the award were not maintainable in either the civil Court or the revenue Court.
Issues: 1. Whether the respondents were estopped from urging that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications under consideration? 2. Whether the subject-matter of reference to arbitration was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court? 3. Whether a revenue Court is also a civil Court within the meaning of the word Court as used in Secs.14 and S.31 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the respondents were not estopped from urging that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications, as the principle of estoppel cannot operate as a bar to the putting forward of an argument that a Court has no jurisdiction. 2. The Court held that the subject-matter of reference was exclusively within the jurisdiction of a revenue Court, as the dispute was about the quantum of produce deliverable to the petitioner as rent, and a suit for recovery of rent would have been exclusively within the cognizance of a revenue Court. 3. The Court held that a revenue Court is not a civil Court within the meaning of the word Court as used in Secs.14 and S.31 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, as the definition of Court in the Act excludes revenue Courts.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the petition and Civil Miscellaneous Petitions Nos.12 to 39 of 1961 with costs.
2. The petitions are directed against orders of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge Mandi whereby applications filed by the petitioner for the filing of an award under Sec.14 of the Arbitration Act of 1940 were thrown out on the ground that the same were not maintainable.
3. The petitioner is the usufructuary mortgagee of certain land in village Kasrela Tehsil Sadar District Mandi and the respondents are the tenants of different parcels of the aforesaid land. There was dispute between the parties about the quantum of rent payable for the years Rabi 2004 B. to 2010 B. which was referred to one Shri Sohan Lal for arbitration. The arbitrator made his award on the 28th of July, 1958, and made an application for the filing of the aforesaid award in the Court of the Assistant Collector first grade Mandi. That application was returned by the learned Assistant Collector on the ground that under the Arbitration Act a revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain it.
Thereafter applications were filed by the petitioner in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge Mandi for the filing of the aforesaid award whichwere in due course transferred to the Additional Sub Judge for disposal who, by his order dated 19-09-1960, dismissed all of them on the ground that the subject-matter of reference was exclusively within the cognizance of a revenue Court and as such a civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain them. The correctness of the aforesaid orders has been challenged by the petitions under consideration.
4. The prayer of the petitioner is that this Court may order the award to be filed in the appropriate Court and pass such other order as may be deemed to be fit and expedient.
5. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that the respondents were estopped from urging that the civil Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the applications and as such he had jurisdiction to entertain them. He further held that the applications were not maintainable inasmuch as the subject-matter of reference was beyond the jurisdiction of a civil Court.
6 Three questions arise for determination:-
(1) Whether the respondents were estopped from urging that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications under consideration?
(2) Whether the subject-matter of reference to arbitration was within the jurisdiction of the civil Court?
(3) Whether a revenue Court is also a civil Court within the meaning of the word Court as used in Secs.14 and S.31 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940?
7. QUESTION NO.1: It has already been noticed that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that the respondents were estopped from pleading that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications on the ground that when the aforesaid applications were filed in the revenue Court they had urged that that Court had no jurisdiction. I am, however, unable to agree with the aforesaid conclusion. It is not the contention of the respondents that the revenue Court has jurisdiction to entertain the applications under consideration. Their contention merely is that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain them and I do not think that the principle of estoppel can operate as a bar to the putting forward of the aforesaid argument.
There may be certain cases which may not be cognizable either by a civil Court or a revenue Court and in such cases if a matter is brought before a civil Court after a finding by the revenue Court that it has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of it the other party may urge that the civil Court has also no jurisdiction to entertain the same and in such cases the princ