2015 Supreme(HP) 420
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.
Nek Ram - Petitioner
Vs.
Financial Commissioner (Appeals) and others - Respondents
CWP No. 2763 of 2014
Decided on : 11.5.2015
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Mr. Surinder Saklani, Advocate.
For the Respondents:Mr.Vivek Singh Attri, Deputy Advocate General.
The main legal point established is the need for a justice-oriented approach in condoning delay, emphasizing a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and the avoidance of a pedantic interpretation of procedural rules.
Headnote:
Delay Condonation - H.P. Land Revenue Act - Section 163 - [Section 5 of the Limitation Act, State of Punjab Vs. Shamlal Murari, AIR 1976 S.C. 1177, Sital Prasad Saxena Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1985 SC 1, Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag Vs. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village Vs. Bhargavi Amma (dead) by LRS and others, (2008) 8 SCC 321] - The court discussed the principles of condonation of delay, emphasizing the need for a liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' and the importance of advancing substantial justice. It cited various cases to highlight the need for a justice-oriented approach and the avoidance of a pedantic interpretation of procedural rules. The court held that the authorities should adopt a justice-oriented approach and ensure that a party is not made to suffer on account of technicalities.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner challenged orders for eviction, arguing that the authorities should have decided the case on merits rather than dismissing the appeal on technicalities. The respondents contended that the petitioner's delays were unjustifiable.
Finding of the Court:
The court found merit in the petition, quashed the impugned orders, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision, emphasizing the need for expeditious resolution due to the prolonged proceedings.
Issues: Dismissal of appeal on technicalities, sufficiency of explanation for delay, and the authority's obligation to decide cases on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need for a justice-oriented approach, liberal interpretation of 'sufficient cause' for delay, and avoidance of a pedantic interpretation of procedural rules.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition, quashed the impugned orders, and remanded the matter for a fresh decision with a directive for expeditious resolution.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan J.
Facts in brief, as are necessary for the adjudication of this writ petition are that, proceeding under Section 163 of the H.P. Land Revenue Act were initiated against the petitioner by Assistant Collector Ist Grade, Mandi and vide order dated 5.1.1993, the petitioner was ordered to be evicted. This order was challenged by the petitioner before the Sub Divisional Collector, Sadar, Mandi on various grounds, however, before the appeal could be heard on merits, the same was dismissed in default on 3.10.2000. Application for restoration came to be filed on 27.1.2003. However, the matter remained pending before respondent No. 3 and ultimately vide order dated 20.1.2012, this application for restoration was rejected. The petitioner filed appeal before the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, who too dismissed the same and left with no other option he approached the Financial Commissioner, who too dismissed the Revision Petition. It is these orders, which have been challenged by the petitioner before this Court on the grounds that the authorities below should not have dismissed the appeal on mere technicalities and should have decide the case on merits.
2. In response to the petition, the respondents in their reply supported the impugned orders and have further contended that the petitioner for his lapses cannot blame the respondents. It is further contended that ample opportunity was afforded to the petitioner for being heard and sufficient time had been granted to him to defend the matter in the Courts below and the present petition has been filed only to prolong the eviction proceedings. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case.
3. A perusal of the impugned orders would show that all the authorities below have been influenced by the fact that the application for restoration had been moved after more than two years and three months, little realizing that the decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of satisfactory explanation. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay to enable the authorities to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of the mattes on merits. The authorities below appear to be oblivious and were expected to bear in mind that ordinarily the applicant applying for condonation of delay does not stand to benefit by lodging his claim late. Refusing to condone delay can result in meritorious matters to be thrown out at the very thresh hold and cause of justice being defeated.
4. It also cannot be lost site that a party, who as per the present adversary legal system, has selected his advocate, briefed him and paid his fee can remain supremely confident that his lawyer will look after his interest and such an innocent party who has done everything in his power has expected of him, should not suffer for the inaction, omission or misdemeanor of his counsel.
5. The procedural rules have to be liberally construed, and care must be taken, that so strict interpretation be not placed thereon, whereby, technicality may tend to triumph over justice. It has to be kept in mind, that an overly strict construction of procedural provisions, may result in the stifling the best case of a party, even if, for adequate reasons, which may be beyond its control.
6. It has to be remembered that procedural law is not an obstruction, but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the hand-maid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant, in the administration of justice. If the breach can be corrected, without injury to the just disposal of a case, regulatory requirement should not be enthroned into a dominant desideratum. Above all, it has to be remembered that the object of Courts and Tribunals is to dispense justice, and not to wreck the end result, on technicalities.
7. In State of Punjab Vs. Shamlal Murari, AIR 1976 S.C. 1177, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as follows:-
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