The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the Limitation Act in the context of arrears and promotion, emphasizing the restriction of arrears to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition in service law disputes.

Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice.

Challenge in this Letters Patent Appeal is to the judgment and order dated 24.3.2009, made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP(T) No. 2534/2008, (OA No. 1283/1996) titled Suresh Chander Chauhan versus H.P.S.E.B., for short “the impugned judgment”, whereby the writ petition came to be partly allowed with direction to the respondent to consider the petitioner’s case for promotion to the post of UDC w.e.f. 30.3.1989, on the basis of his seniority and pay consequential benefits for a period of three years prior to the filing of the petition, on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal.

2. Respondent-Board has not questioned the impugned judgment. Thus, the impugned judgment has attained finality so far as the same relates to it.

3. The petitioner has questioned the impugned judgment only to the extent that the Writ Court has fallen in an error in restricting the backwages to three years, prior to filing of the writ petition.

4. Heard.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the petitioner was entitled to arrears right from the date he was entitled to promotion, i.e., w.e.f. 30.3.1989 but the respondent, without any rhyme or reason, has not considered his case for promotion despite the fact that the petitioner has made so many representations and was projecting his case regularly and ultimately order Annexure A3 dated 24.4.1996, came to be passed, was subject matter of the writ petition and which stands quashed by the Writ Court. Hence, the petitioner cannot be deprived of his right on the ground of limitation. The argument though attractive, is devoid of any force, for the following reasons.

6. The Limitation Act, 1963, for short “the Act” provides for some mechanism or period within which an aggrieved person can seek the redressal of his grievances.

7. The question arose for the first time before the apex Court in case Jai Dev Gupta versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another reported in AIR 1998 SC 2819, whether the arrears can be restricted only for three years prior to the filing of the writ petition, in terms of the mandate of Limitation Act. The question was answered in affirmative by the apex Court. It is apposite to reproduce paras 2 and 3 of the said judgment herein.

“2. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that before approaching the Tribunal the appellant was making number of representations to the appropriate authorities claiming the relief and that was the reason for not approaching the Tribunal earlier than May, 1989. We do not think that such an excuse can be advanced to claim the difference in backwages from the year 1971. In Administrator of Union Territory of Daman and Diu v. R. D. Valand, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 593, this Court while setting aside an order of Central Administrative Tribunal has observed that the Tribunal was not justified in putting the clock back by more than 15 years and the Tribunal fell into patent error in brushing aside the question of limitation by observing that the respondent has been making representations from time to time and as such the limitation would not come in his way. In the light of the above decision, we cannot entertain the arguments of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the difference in backwages should be paid right from the year 1971. At the same time we do not think that the Tribunal was right in invoking Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act for restricting the difference in backwages by one year.

3. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the appellant is entitled to get the difference in backwages from May, 1986. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.” [emphasis supplied]

8. In the case in hand, which was subject matter of the above writ petition, the petitioner had approached for the redressal of his grievances in the month of March, 1989 though his right has accrued in the year 1978, thus, the arrears was rightly restricted