Sandeep Sharma, J.

Complainant namely Pushpa Devi (PW1) in her statement recorded under Section 154 CrPC to the police, alleged that on 28.4.2012, she along with her son namely Rahul, got down from the bus near Victory Tunnel to board the bus for IGMC Shimla. She further alleged that when she was coming towards local bus-stand from victory tunnel and was crossing the road with her son to reach the bus stand, at about 9:15 am, accused driving yellow colored bus No. HP63-3050 banged the driver side of his bus with the complainant and her son, as a consequence of which, they fell unconscious and fell down. Constable Pardeep Kumar PW2 sent both the complainant and her son to IGMC in a Taxi. On the basis of aforesaid statement made under Section 154 CrPC, formal FIR Ext.PW9-A, came to be registered against the respondent-accused. After completion of investigation, police presented challan in the competent Court of law, who on being satisfied that prima-facie case exists against the accused, put notice of accusation to the accused under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. However, fact remains that he did not lead any evidence in his defence.

2. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence collected on record by the prosecution held the accused not guilty of having committed offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and accordingly, acquitted him. In the aforesaid background, appellant-State has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for conviction of the accused-respondent after setting aside judgment of acquittal recorded by the court below.

3. Mr. Vikrant Chandel, learned Deputy Advocate General, while inviting attention of this Court to the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court, vehemently contended that same is not based upon proper appreciation of evidence and as such, same deserves to be quashed and set-aside. While referring to the evidence led on record by the prosecution, Mr. Chandel, strenuously argued that prosecution successfully proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the date of alleged incident, vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently by the respondent accused, as a result of which, complainant and her son suffered simple as well as grievous injuries. While terming the impugned judgment to be erroneous, learned Deputy Advocate General contended that all the material prosecution witnesses unequivocally stated before the court below that incident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the respondent-accused and as such, there was no scope left for the court below to acquit the respondent accused, rather he was required to be convicted for having committed offence punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC.

4. Per contra, Mr. D.S. Tanta, Advocate, representing the accused-respondent supported the impugned judgment of acquittal recorded by the court below and contended that bare perusal of same suggests that same is based upon proper appreciation of evidence and there is no illegality and infirmity in the same and as such, there is no scope of interference, especially when it clearly emerges from the bare reading of the impugned judgment that court has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter very meticulously. Mr. Tanta, invited attention of this Court to the statements of prosecution witnesses to demonstrate that none of the prosecution witnesses specifically stated something specific with regard to rash and negligent driving of the accused, and as such, learned court below rightly arrived at conclusion that prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that complainant and her son suffered injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of the respondent-accused.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record, this Court finds that there is no dispute as far as factum of accident allegedly occurred on 28.4.2