The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, considering the nature of the offence, settlement between the parties, and impact on society.

JUDGMENT

Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J —Cr.Mp(M) No. 262 of 2018

By medium of this application, the applicant/petitioner has sought condonation of 55 days delay, which has crept up in filing of the revision petition. For the reasons so assigned and set-out in the application, the same is allowed and the aforesaid delay is condoned. Application stands disposed of.

Criminal Revision be registered.

Cr. Revision No. 72 of 2018

2. Looking to the nature of order, I propose to pass, it is not at all necessary to deal with the facts in detail. Suffice it to state that the complainant-respondent No.1 filed a complaint against the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short ''Act'') which after trial was allowed by the trial Magistrate and the petitioner was ordered to be convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,20, 000/- to the complainant. The petitioner filed an appeal assailing the aforesaid conviction and sentence and the same was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, H.P. It is thereafter that the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition assailing the aforesaid judgments passed by the learned Courts below.

3. Today, the complainant/respondent No.1 Sesu is present in the Court and identified as such by his counsel Sh. Naveen Awasthi, Advocate. The complainant/respondent No.1 states that he has received the entire amount from the petitioner and is not interested to pursue the matter any further against the petitioner.

4. From the records of the case, I find that this is not a case wherein the offence for which the petitioner has been charged can ''stricto sensu'' be termed to be an offence against the State. Therefore, this is a case where the continuation of criminal case against the petitioner would put the petitioner to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not setting aside the impugned judgments of conviction and sentence.

5. This court is not powerless in such situation and adequate powers have been conferred upon it not only under sections 397 read with Section 401 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. (hereinafter referred to as the Code) but also under Section 147 of the Act for accepting the settlement entered into between the parties and to quash the proceedings arising out of the proceedings, which have consequently culminated into a settlement. This power has been conferred to subserve the ends of justice or/ and to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. Though, such power is required to be exercised with circumspection and in cases which do not involve heinous and serious offence of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc.

6. Further, the moot question is also whether the Court in such like cases can set aside the judgments of conviction and sentence where the petitioner has been charged under Section 138 of the Act.

This question need not detain this Court any longer in view of the three Judges'' Bench decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai and others versus State of Gujarat and another, Criminal Appeal No. 1723 of 2017, decided on 4th October, 2017, wherein after taking into consideration the entire law on the subject, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has laid down the following broad principles for exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code which read thus:-

"(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence