2018 Supreme(HP) 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.
Lomesh - Appellant
Versus
State Of H P & Anr. - Respondents
Criminal Miscellaneous (Main) No. 454 of 2018
Decided On : 08-10-2018
T.K. Verma, Adv., Vinod Thakur, Adv., Sudhir Bhatnagar, Adv., Bhupinder Thakur, Adv., Gurudev Negi, Adv.
The court emphasized that the power to quash criminal proceedings should be exercised to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the court's process, considering the nature and gravity of the offence.
Headnote:
Compromise - Quashing of FIR - IPC 279, 337, 338, MV Act 185
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought to quash FIR No. 111/2017, which was registered under IPC Sections 279, 337, 338 and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, based on a compromise with the complainant.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the possibility of conviction was remote and bleak, and continuing the criminal case would cause oppression and prejudice to the petitioner. It held that quashing the FIR would secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the court's process.
Issues: The main issue was whether the FIR could be quashed based on a compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principles established in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Parbatbhai Aahir vs. State of Gurjar, emphasizing that the power to quash under Section 482 is distinct from compounding of offences and should be exercised to secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of the court's process.
Final Decision: The court quashed the FIR against the petitioner under IPC Sections 279, 337, 338 and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.
JUDGMENT
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ''Code'') has been preferred by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 111/2017, dated 02.07.2017, registered at Police Station, Rampur-Bushehar, District Shimla, H.P. under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 on the basis of compromise entered into between the petitioner-accused and respondent No. 2-complainant.
2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No. 2 has filed a complaint case bearing FIR No. 111 of 2017, registered at Police Station Rampur-Bushehar, District Shimla, H.P. under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 185 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 on 02.07.2017.
3. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 are present and have been identified as such by their learned counsels.
4. It is stated by learned counsel for the petitioner that the parties are friends and have compromised the matter as per Annexure P-2 annexed to the petition.
5. However, the moot question is whether the FIR in such like cases can, in fact, be quashed on the basis of compromise.
6. The issue in question has been extensively dealt with by the Bench of Hon''ble three Judges of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab , (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein the relative scope of inherent power of High Court under Section 482 to quash criminal proceedings of non-compoundable offences in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties have been considered extensively. Discussing different provisions and taking into consideration the different decisions rendered by it, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as follows:-
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be c