The main legal point established in the judgment is the broad applicability of the provision of Section 311 Cr.P.C., the necessity for just decision, essentiality of evidence, and the duty of the court to find out the truth and render a just decision. The judgment emphasizes the need for exercising the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C. with care, caution, and circumspection.

JUDGMENT

Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - Aggrieved by the dismissal of the application filed by the complainant/petitioner under Section 311 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition assailing the order passed on 21.8.2018.

2. Evidently, it is not in dispute that the respondent has been awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs.3000/- per month and compensation of Rs.50,000/- by the learned trial Magistrate and the same has been assailed by the petitioner in appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, which is pending adjudication, wherein during the course of these proceedings, the petitioner moved an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for tendering in evidence the copy of letter dated 24.7.2015 vide which the petitioner got the information under Right to Information Act from the PIO-cum-Deputy Director of Elementary Education, Hamirpur regarding the employment of the respondent as TGT in S.D. Public School, Hamirpur.

3. The only ground of which this application was objected to by the respondent was that the same was not relevant for the present case as it was based on subsequent development, whereas the order of the trial Court was based on merits and the application had been moved with malafide intention just to prolong the litigation.

4. The learned Sessions Judge dismissed the application by according the following reasons:-

"....Since the respondent is working in a private school and no salary has been disclosed by the school and the salary is purely negotiable and this letter sent by the PIO-cum-Dy. Director Elementary Education is not essential document in order to set at rest the controversy as the petitioner has filed the petition under Section 12 of Protection of Women from the Domestic Violence Act and the respondent NO.1/appellant has been directed only to pay the maintenance to the tune of Rs.3000/- per month. Apart from this, he has been directed to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- and Rs.10,000/- as litigation expenses and the order passed by the learned trial Court in the petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act has no annexes with the present application and the letter intended to be placed on record in additional evidence. Hence, present application is dismissed. It be tagged with the main file."

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record.

5. At the outset, this Court is firstly required to deal with the scope and ambit of Section 311 Cr.P.C. The provisions have been considered in detail by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana versus Ram Mehar and others , (2016) 8 SCC 762, wherein the entire law on the subject was discussed in detail in the following manner:-

"26. Having dwelled upon the concept of fair trial we may now proceed to the principles laid down in the precedents of this Court, applicability of the same to a fact situation and duty of the court under Section 311 CrPC. The said provision reads as follows:-

"311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.- Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re- examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case."

27. A quarter of a century back, a two-Judge Bench in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India , (1991) Supp1 SCC 271 has held that: (SCC pp.276-77, paras 7-9)

"7.....Section 311 is an almost verbatim reproduction of Section 540 of the old Code except for the insertion of the words ''to be'' before the word ''essential'' occurring in the old section. This section is manifestly in two parts. Whereas the word used in the first part is ''may'' the word used in the second part is ''shall''. In consequence, the first part whi