Point of law: Possession of land - The only claim which could become raised, was that within the corners of a saving clause occurring in the statute, rather the suit land was save-able from vestment. However, the afore plea become neither averred nor any evidence in consonance therewith became adduced. Thereupon, no benefit of the apposite saving clause can became conferred upon the plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT :

The plaintiffs/appellants instituted a Civil Suit bearing No. 145 of 1993 before the learned Senior Sub Judge, Hamirpur. In the afore drawn suit, the plaintiffs claimed, for a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction being pronounced against the defendants, and, vis-à-vis, the suit khasra numbers. The afore Civil Suit became decreed by the learned trial Court. However, the decreeing of the plaintiffs’ suit, by the learned trial Court, was made subject to the plaintiffs becoming evicted from the suit land, in accordance with law.

2. The aggrieved defendant No.1/respondent herein carried there-against Civil Appeal No. 184 of 1998 before the learned District Judge, Hamirpur. Moreover the aggrieved plaintiffs also within the afore Civil Appeal preferred cross-objections No. 04 of 1999. Both the Civil Appeal and Cross-objections (supra) became cumulatively decided through a common verdict made thereons on 6.5.2004. Through the afore made verdict, the learned District Judge rejected the cross-objections, and, partly allowed the appeal of the aggrieved defendant to the extent, that the plaintiffs and proforma defendant No.2, being made amenable for eviction from the suit land, through recoursings by the defendant of the procedure constituted under law.

3. The plaintiffs become aggrieved from the verdict recorded by the learned first appellate Court, and, are led to institute there-against the instant appeal before this Court.

4. When the appeal came up for admission before this Court, this Court had admitted the same, on the here-in-after extracted substantial questions of law:-

1. Whether the suit land could not have vested in the Panchayat and consequently in the State of Himachal Pradesh in view of the provisions of Sections 2 (g) and 4 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

2. Whether the suit land could not have been defined as Shamlat Deh because it was in possession of the plaintiffs/predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs on the coming into force of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.”

5. A perusal of the jamabandi appertaining to the year 1954-1955, does vividly disclose, that therein a reference is made to mutation No. 68. A reading of the afore mutation No. 68 also does unveil, that the suit land was sanctioned as Nautor, vis-à-vis, one Shankar Dass, hence through an order made on 12.2.1954, by the Deputy Commissioner Kangra. However, though through the afore made order, the suit land became granted as Nautor, to one Shankar Dass, yet the tenure of the relevant grant became limited only for a period of five years. Upon expiry of afore tenure of the grant of the suit land, as made to the afore Shankar Dass, the defendants concerned through making hence on 12.12.1963 mutation No. 76, rather cancelled the grant of land, as made, by way of Nautor to the afore Shankar Dass.

6. Further more, through mutation No. 78 attested on 30.6.1964, the suit land became vested in the Gram Panchayat concerned. Subsequent to the making of mutation No. 78 hence on 30.6.1964, obviously in tandem therewith rather corresponding entries are made in the jamabandi(s) appertaining to the suit land. The plaintiffs for theirs ensuring, the decreeing of their suit, were enjoined to place on record the Nautor allotment rules, as were prevalent in contemporanity to the grant of suit land, being made in favour of Shankar Dass, hence through an order made by the Deputy Commissioner concerned on 12.2.1954, and, the afore rules also making candid bespeaking(s), that there occur no provisions therein, hence, reducing or curtailing the grant of land by way of Nautor to one Shankar Dass. Since only upon adduction of afore relevant rules, the plaintiffs could succeed in convincing this Court, that the restriction of the tenure of the apposite grant up to five years by the Deputy Commissioner, through his making an order of 12.2.1954, was invalid to the extent, that it breached the afore relevant rules, whereas, the