The possession of property pursuant to a transaction that is void ab initio is illegal and adverse to the true owner's title from the beginning, leading to the bar of limitation under the Limitation Act.

JUDGMENT :

Surjit Singh, J.

The present Regular Second Appeal was, initially, admitted on 7th April, 1998. It appears that at the time of its admission, on the aforesaid date, substantial questions of law were not framed. Such questions were framed on 19th October, 2009, which are to the following effect:

1. Whether the suit filed by the Plaintiffs is barred by limitation keeping in view the Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act?

2. Whether the period of limitation for claiming adverse possession would commence from the date when the Defendants' right of title is held to be void by a Court of Law?

2. Facts relevant for disposal of the appeal may be noticed. Late Shri Jodh Ram, the predecessor of the present Plaintiffs-Appellants, late Shri Dharam Singh, now represented by his L.Rs. Defendants-Respondents No. 1 to 3, and Defendant-Respondent Fateh Singh, were real brothers. On 24th February, 1972, Jodh Ram executed a gift deed in favour of Dharam Singh and Fateh Singh, in respect of the suit land. He challenged that gift deed, by filing a Civil Suit in 1973. He pleaded that the gift was the result of misrepresentation and coercion practised by Dharam Singh and Fateh Singh. Suit was decreed by the trial Court. Learned District Judge reversed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Matter came in appeal to this Court, by way of Regular Second Appeal. Accepting the appeal, this Court held that the gift deed was void, as there was a consideration for the same and, thus, it was hit by Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act.

3. Though, the Plaintiff in that suit, namely Jodh Ram, the predecessor of the present Plaintiffs-Appellants, had, besides seeking revocation of the gift deed, prayed for a decree for possession, the trial Court and this Court granted only a decree of declaration that the gift deed was void, but did not pass a decree for possession of the land, which was the subject matter of the gift deed.

4. After the matter was decided in favour of Jodh Ram by this Court, in Regular Second Appeal, he filed another suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, for possession of the suit property. The suit was filed on 12th December, 1994.

5. The suit was contested and one of the grounds raised in the written statement was that the same was barred by time. Trial Court decreed the suit. It held that the suit was within time. Learned District Judge, to whom the appeal was carried by the Defendants-Respondents, accepted the appeal, set aside the decree of the trial Court and consequently dismissed the suit, mainly on the ground that it was barred by time. Learned first Appellate Court took the view that the adverse possession of the Defendants-Respondents started the day they were put in possession of the suit land, as domes. Plaintiffs'-Appellants' contention that adverse possession was to be counted from the date of the acceptance of the Regular Second Appeal by this Court, in the earlier suit, did not find favour with the learned District Judge.

6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record.

7. It is not in dispute that the gift deed, which was revoked and declared to be void by this Court, was void ab initio. It is well settled that when a person gets into possession of some immoveable property pursuant to a transaction, which is void ab initio, his possession is illegal and, hence, adverse to the title of the true owner, from the very beginning.

8. In the present case, gift deed was executed on 24th February, 1972 and the suit for possession was filed on 12th December, 1994, or say more than 12 years after the Defendants-Respondents came in possession of the suit land, under the gift deed, which was void ab initio and had been declared to be so in the earlier round of litigation. Thus, the suit was barred by time, on the face of it.

9. In view of the above stated position, both the substantial questions of law are answered against the Plaintiffs-Appellants. Consequently, the appeal is d